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In this paper we examine the interaction between globalization and India’s federal 
system, in the context of the country’s past decade of economic reform. In doing so, we 
explicitly recognize that the national government has subnational governments below it, 
and that all these layers of government simultaneously interact with foreign governments 
and corporations in a global economy. These multiple interactions have become more 
important as reform in India has opened up the economy to foreign trade and investment, 
and also reduced certain constraints on subnational governments. Globalization provides 
challenges as well as opportunities to federal systems such as India’s and this paper seeks 
to elucidate what these are, as well as drawing implications for policy and institutional 
reform. We highlight the problems caused for the financial sector as a whole by state and 
central fiscal deficits. We examine the implications of the new ability of state 
governments to directly seek FDI. We discuss the possibility that privatization of the 
financial sector can discipline governments at all levels, and the possible role of capital 
account liberalization in achieving this. We review past and proposed reforms in the 
intergovernmental transfer and tax systems, and argue for harder subnational budget 
constraints. We discuss possibilities for politically acceptable packages of fiscal reforms. 
Finally, we examine issues of growing regional inequality, including the regional 
concentration of FDI in India’s more liberalized economy. We also discuss the possibility 
that growing regional inequalities might require the intergovernmental transfer system to 
be more efficient and effective in its objectives. We examine how these possibilities may 
be compatible with the hardening of subnational budget constraints.  
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“India is a Union of States based on the framework of cooperative federalism. Within the 
cooperative framework, there is also a requirement to develop competitive strengths for the States 
so that they can excel at the national level and the global level. Competitiveness helps in ensuring 
economic and managerial efficiency and to be creative to meet new challenges. These are 
essential to survive and prosper in a fast changing world of today. In addition, in order to 
strengthen democratic processes and institution, we should all truly strive for substantive 
decentralization.” 
 
From speech by Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam on his assumption of office as President of India  




In this paper we examine the interaction between globalization and India’s federal 
system, in the context of the country’s past decade of economic reform. In doing so, we 
recognize that the national government has subnational governments below it, and that all 
these layers of government simultaneously interact with foreign governments and 
corporations in a global economy. These multiple interactions have become more 
important as reform in India has opened up the economy to foreign trade and investment, 
and also reduced certain constraints on subnational governments. Globalization provides 
challenges as well as opportunities to federal systems such as India’s and this paper seeks 
to elucidate these, as well as drawing implications for policy and institutional reform.1 
 
In economic terms, globalization can be taken as the increased international mobility of 
goods, capital, labor and knowledge. A cornerstone of Indian economic reform has been 
opening up to flows of goods and factors, thus integrating more closely with the global 
economy. 2  In Section 2, we review the process of economic reform in India and the 
outcomes in terms of growth and other economic performance indicators. Within the 
context of opening up the economy, we can conceptualize reforms as falling into two 
groups, the first involving redrawing of state-market boundaries, and the second 
concerned with reconfiguring governmental institutions themselves, at several levels of 
the federation. The first group includes financial sector reforms, assignment of regulatory 
powers, infrastructure development, and privatization. The second group includes tax 
reforms, reform of center-state fiscal transfer mechanisms, and decentralization.  
 
Section 3 provides an overview of India’s institutions of federalism. We summarize the 
legislative system, which is the essence of the federal structure (because it 
institutionalizes constituents’ expression of subnational authority), as well as federal 
                                                 
1 For examples of recent interest in the intersection of federalism, globalization and economic policy see 
Sáez (2002), which is specifically on India, but includes some comparisons to China, and the journal 
symposium introduced by Watts (2001), which covers a wide range of countries and political and economic 
issues. 
2 See, for example, Srinivasan and Tendulkar (2002). 
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aspects of various branches of government, including the judiciary, bureaucracy, and 
regional aspects of India’s political parties. We then describe the constitutional 
assignment of powers to different levels of the federation, including tax and expenditure 
assignments. We summarize the intergovernmental transfer system, both in terms of its 
initial conception, as well as its subsequent evolution. Finally, we discuss the formal and 
informal institutions of intergovernmental relations, such as the National Development 
Council and the Inter-State Council. 
 
Section 4 examines the interaction of globalization and India’s federal system by looking 
at national vs. subnational reforms. For example, greater openness has increased 
competition for Indian manufacturing, but both federal and state level controls on product 
markets substantially hinder the achievement of competitiveness, despite the removal of 
many industrial-licensing controls. We examine the extent to which state and central 
policies may need to respond, based on the constitutional assignments of authority. For 
example, agricultural policy reforms will require a joint approach. We examine the 
impact of labor market restrictions and government ownership, and the possible role of 
the center and states in policy reforms. Finally, we touch on infrastructure issues, such as 
the extreme problems of the state-owned power sector, and the important federal 
dimensions that make reform more difficult there. In discussing the financial sector, we 
highlight the problems caused for the financial sector as a whole by state and central 
fiscal deficits. We trace this problem to the continued importance of the central 
government in controlling the financial sector, including the effective ‘parking’ of fiscal 
deficits in the banking sector. We examine the changes in policy with respect to foreign 
direct investment (FDI), and the implications of the new ability of state governments to 
directly seek FDI. We discuss the possibility that privatization of the financial sector can 
act as a disciplining device on governments at all levels, and the possible role of capital 
account liberalization in achieving rapid, effective privatization of the financial sector.  
 
In Section 5 we turn to issues of intergovernmental relations in the context of reform. 
Thus we view the reform process as encompassing the federal system, rather than just 
interacting with it. We review the ongoing process of strengthening local governments, as 
well as past and proposed reforms in the intergovernmental transfer and tax systems. We 
examine the role of the tax system in promoting or hindering the emergence of a unified 
internal market for goods and services in India, and the potential for reform of tax 
assignments, tax rates, and tax enforcement. We argue for harder subnational budget 
constraints as a feature of a reformed federal transfer system. To some degree, reforms in 
federal governance hold the key to opening the door to further reform elsewhere, by 
reducing the fiscal burden placed on the private sector by government deficits. We 
acknowledge the political economy aspects of reform of governance, and discuss 
possibilities for politically acceptable packages of fiscal reforms, such as combinations of 
changes in tax assignment that would be acceptable to the center as well as the state 
governments. We also examine issues of growing regional inequality in the context of an 
economy with fewer barriers to the movement of capital. We relate this to possible 
implications for regional policy, tax assignments, the intergovernmental transfer system, 
and the need to harden subnational budget constraints. Section 6 is a summary 
conclusion, where we tie in our discussion of real and financial sector reforms and 
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reforms of federal governance with globalization as a process that provides both 
pressures for change and instruments to achieve positive change.  
 
 
2. Overview of India’s Economy and Recent Reform 
India is a large and poor developing country. After independence in 1947, it pursued 
economic policies that gave the government a primary role in promoting economic 
development. While the country’s size dictated some kind of federal structure, the 
arrangements that were adopted in the Constitution (ratified in 1950), and their 
subsequent evolution gave the central government a dominant position vis-à-vis the 
constituent units of the nation (states and territories).  India’s leaders aspired toward an 
indigenous version of Soviet-influenced socialism, with government as benevolent 
guardian, leavened with a smattering of Gandhian influences in favor of smallness, self-
sufficiency and rural traditions. The ruling Congress Party adopted a resolution in 1955 
that to achieve a ‘socialistic pattern of society’ would be India’s objective. This was later 
incorporated into the Constitution through an amendment in 1976. 
 
Through the 1970s, India’s economic growth was reasonable, averaging 3.75 percent per 
year, but this was not rapid enough to significantly diminish the number of poor people, 
nor to deal comfortably with the strains associated with governing a country with 
substantial ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity along with economic inequalities. 
Nevertheless, India was able to preserve its unity, as well as the political system of 
parliamentary democracy adopted in its early years. However, this political stability was 
accompanied by the evolution of an economic system riddled with increasing rigidities, 
inefficiencies and corruption, the so-called ‘license-quota-permit raj’.  This system was 
accompanied by political and economic centralization, with Soviet-style development 
planning, but with looser implementation, largely determined at the national level. Some 
states, such as West Bengal and Kerala, did pursue more independent policies, but this 
was within centrally determined constraints. However, no state government seriously 
challenged the ‘socialist’ approach to economic management. At the same time, with 
some state-level exceptions (e.g., West Bengal and Kerala), there was relatively little 
progress in potentially socialist policies such as land reform, or universal primary 
education. 
 
In the 1980s, partly through fresh ideological influences, and partly through the 
observation of faster growth in many East Asian economies, India’s economic 
policymakers at the national level began to seriously attempt some changes in the overall 
approach to the role of government in the country’s economic development, introducing 
some liberalization in the trade regime, loosening domestic industrial controls, and 
promoting investment in modern technologies for areas such as telecommunications. 
While this reform process was restricted to the center, it coincided with some weakening 
of central political control by the end of the decade.  Growth accelerated to 5.8 percent 
during 1980-90, but this came at the cost of macroeconomic imbalances (fiscal and 
current account deficits), which worsened at the beginning of the 1990s as a result of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, which had become a major trading partner and ally, and of 
turmoil in the Middle East. 
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In 1991 India faced a severe balance of payments crisis, and this circumstance became 
the occasion for a substantial advance in the pace and nature of economic reforms that 
were being attempted. In particular, the major steps taken were further trade 
liberalization, in the form of reductions in tariffs and conversion of quantitative 
restrictions to tariffs, and a sweeping away of a large segment of restrictions on domestic 
industrial investment. These two changes in the early 1990s have come to symbolize or 
encapsulate the term ‘economic reform’ in India.  Note that the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991 and the stellar growth performance of China after its opening to the world 
economy and initiation of market oriented reforms in the 1980s were two very significant 
developments that forced systemic reform in India in the 1990s, as compared to a 
temporary liberalization (soon reversed) in an earlier balance of payments crisis in 1966. 
The more thoroughgoing nature of the 1990s reform also opened up space for action by 
state governments, as we discuss below. 
 
The move to reduce the role of government in directly controlling the working of markets 
had additional implications. It was recognized that sectors such as finance and 
telecommunications required a new set of regulatory structures suitable for an 
environment in which bureaucrats were no longer making discretionary judgments on a 
case-by-case basis. This need was strengthened by the direct and indirect impacts of 
technological change in such sectors.  Furthermore, it was recognized that removing 
industrial investment controls could not by itself solve India’s problem of slow growth, 
but needed to be complemented by restructuring the working of the labor market, and by 
improving the economy’s physical and institutional infrastructure. Achieving the first of 
these objectives has been hampered by understandable interest group pressures, while the 
second goal has been constrained by the continued high level of the government’s fiscal 
deficit.  
 
The high fiscal deficit, in turn, is traceable to subsidies to interest groups, as well as the 
nature of the interaction between the central and state governments. Table 1 summarizes 
the trends in central and state fiscal deficits over the 1990s.3 It shows that much of the 
deterioration in the fiscal deficit has occurred at the state government level. Both the 
center and the states were severely affected by the large pay increases granted to central 
government employees in 1997-98, followed by similar increases at the state level the 
following year.4  
 
Despite the internal political roadblocks to accomplishing comprehensive economic 
reforms, India was able to achieve a slight acceleration of growth in the 1990s as 
compared to the previous decade. However, growth statistics indicate that there was a 
deceleration in the latter half of the 1990s, even before the current global recession took 
hold. Tables 2 and 3 provide a summary of the size and structure of India’s economy and 
                                                 
3 For more detailed discussions of these trends, see Acharya (2002), Rao (2002) and Srinivasan (2002). 
4 This is an example of interest group pressures at work: the pay award was larger than that recommended 
by the technical advisory body, the Fifth Pay Commission, and was not accompanied by the reduction in 
staffing that the Commission also recommended. See Acharya (2002) and Srinivasan (2002) for further 
discussion. 
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changes over time (Table 2), and economic performance along a wide range of 
dimensions over the last two decades (Table 3). One of the striking features of growth in 
the last decade has been the anemic performance of Indian industry, and the associated 
lack of a shift from agriculture to industry in the share of GDP. On the other hand, 
services have done well, partly as a result of the boom in software exports and, more 
recently, in IT-enabled services such as call centers. These aspects of services, and 
remittances from non-resident Indians have contributed to India’s reasonably good export 
performance, and to its avoidance of further balance of payments difficulties. 
 
From the perspective of trying to capture the benefits of participating more fully in the 
global economy, reform, though triggered by a short-run crisis, must also be viewed in 
the context of long-run globalizing trends. Globalization may bring down prices of some 
goods, lead to more efficient allocations of factors, and allow relatively capital-scarce 
countries such as India to gain greater access to foreign capital and technology for 
enhancing economic growth. This is the standard way in which openness supports private 
(and potentially also public5) economic activity. From the perspective of the government, 
however, there may be new challenges in a world of factor and goods mobility. The 
ability of the government to tax is affected, since mobile factors can escape the incidence 
of taxes that initially are placed on them. Furthermore, regulatory policies can be subject 
to similar problems in the face of factor mobility, as in fears of races to the bottom in 
regulatory standard-setting. 
 
The reforms of the 1990s gave state governments more freedom to make policies 
independently,6 and this has extended the impacts of openness and globalization to the 
subnational level. In particular, while only the national government can determine import 
duties, state governments now can affect the incentives of foreign capital to enter their 
jurisdictions. From the perspective of an Indian state, capital from another country or 
from another state can be viewed through the same lens, and must be treated equally in 
typical policy environments. The final impacts of the entry of capital on a subnational 
government will therefore depend also on the internal mobility of capital and labor. 
Hence, in a federal system, attention must be paid to internal mobility of goods and 
factors, in addition to external liberalization. Subnational tax and regulatory policies can 
assume greater importance in a scenario of economic reform under globalization. A 
further consideration is that the fiscal health of the states that results from their policies is 
likely to impinge on the entire nation’s credit rating in world capital markets.7 We shall 
explore these aspects of India’s subnational economic reforms in Sections 4 and 5. 
 
                                                 
5 This is particularly the case when the government produces private goods. 
6 The responses of the states were varied, as were the results. Bajpai and Sachs (1999) provide a detailed 
survey and scorecard of the efforts and outcomes for 15 major states, arguing that the enthusiastic 
reformers have done better in terms of human development as well as narrow economic well being. They 
treat the states as independent actors (within constraints imposed by the center), whereas in this paper we 
emphasize the interactions and overlaps of national and subnational reforms. 
7 The mechanism by which this occurs can be indirect, through contingent liabilities arising from explicit 
central counter guarantees for state guarantees to foreign corporations, or direct, through the observation of 
larger deficits for the center and states combined. 
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Another federal aspect of India’s reform is that the decade of the 1990s has seen an 
increase in regional inequality in some dimensions. While inequalities may have widened 
within states as well (for example, the coastal and urban areas of Maharashtra and 
Gujarat versus their interior rural regions), the main focus has been and will be on 
widening disparities across the states themselves. This is natural, given the size and 
political importance of the states, and the fact that the states are the direct and indirect 
channels for significant financial transfers from the central government. We also consider 
whether aspects of economic reform, larger global economic forces, and state-level initial 
conditions and policy responses are increasing regional inequalities within the country, 
and whether the mechanisms that exist within India’s federal structures for managing 
regional inequalities are adequate. 
 
To conclude this section with a return to the national-level overview, underlying the 
aggregate performance statistics in Tables 2 and 3, we have a story of incomplete 
economic reforms, with sectors such as agriculture still shackled by an inefficient public 
procurement and distribution system and severe input market distortions, industry 
hampered by small scale reservations and inefficient financing, a financial sector still 
dominated by direct and indirect public control of investible resources, and labor market 
rigidities that hamper the entire organized (as opposed to informal) segment of the 
economy.  Liberalization of trade and foreign investment – the ‘globalization’ aspect of 
India’s reforms – has helped in some areas, but has not been sufficient to promote 
widespread competitiveness, nor to overcome or rectify the poor state of India’s 




3. India’s Federal Structures  
Political and Administrative Structures 
We preface a discussion of the institutions and mechanisms that govern fiscal federal 
arrangements in India, particularly center-state transfers and loans, with an overview of 
India’s broader federal structure. India is a constitutional democracy, comprised of 28 
states, and seven “Union Territories” (see Figure 1). Of the seven, two Union Territories 
(Delhi and Pondicherry) have their own elected legislatures whereas the rest are governed 
directly by appointees of the center. All the states have elected legislatures, with Chief 
Ministers in the executive role. Each state also has a Governor, nominally appointed by 
the President, but effectively an agent of the Prime Minister. The Governor normally has 
only a minor political role at the state level. However, Governors have, in the past, used 
special constitutional provisions (notably Article 356) to dismiss elected legislatures, 
though this practice has been reined in more recently. The constitution also assigns 
certain statutory powers to the states: the exact nature of this assignment, and how it has 
played out in practice, determine the extent of centralization within the federation.8  
                                                 
8 There are various special provisions (e.g., affecting scope of governance and local property ownership) 
with respect to the northeastern hill states, and even more so for Jammu and Kashmir (Article 370), though 
the latter’s constitutional autonomy has been reduced over time.  This reduction represents a relatively easy 
amendment procedure, which has tended to increase centralization: examples of this tendency are offered 
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In addition, since many of the Indian states are quite large in terms of population (with 
the largest dozen being comparable in population to larger European countries), 
devolution of powers to the states without any further decentralization below that level 
may still represent a relatively centralized federation. In practice, devolution of economic 
and political power to both the states and to local government bodies has arguably been 
weak compared to other federal systems, since both constitutional assignments and the 
subsequent exercise of legislative powers have tended to be in the direction of greater 
centralization. Centralization has also been reflected in bureaucratic and judicial 
institutions and their interactions with the legislative/executive branch of government, as 
we elaborate below. 
 
The primary expression of statutory constitutional authority in India comes through 
directly elected parliamentary-style governments at the national and state level, as well as 
nascent directly elected government bodies at various local levels.9 In legislatures at each 
level, there is the usual playing out of bargaining among individuals, factions and parties, 
as analyzed theoretically by authors such as Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Inman and 
Rubinfeld (1997). Regional and personal factions have always been important in Indian 
politics, but the main spoils have typically been control of various ministries, rather than 
provisions attached to specific pieces of legislation. There have been some ideological 
factors at work in Indian politics (various shades of socialism, for example), but they are 
often dominated by material interests. 
 
To the extent that the essence of federalism is based on representative democratic politics 
at the subnational level, the role of political parties in the interactions between central and 
state level politics is a crucial aspect of federal structures.  To illustrate, consider the 
extreme case where government powers are notionally decentralized, with all residuary 
powers assigned to the state level, but the national and all state governments are 
controlled by a single, rigidly hierarchical political party.  Here the outcome will 
effectively be the same as in a centralized, unitary system, since decisions are made at the 
top of the political hierarchy. For example, during the Nehru era, the Prime Minister’s 
personal authority and prestige were combined with almost complete legislative control 
of the center and the states by the Congress Party led by Nehru. In such circumstances, 
issues of center-state relations were often played out within the ranks of the Congress 
party. 
 
Over time, Indian political parties have embodied varying degrees of centralization, 
including the regional political bosses of the earlier Congress party,10 the tightly 
controlled personalized approach characteristic of the later Congress under Indira 
                                                                                                                                                 
later in this section. 
9 These are all single constituency first-past-the-post elections, but with some seats reserved for 
disadvantaged groups, such as Scheduled Castes (erstwhile “untouchables”) at each level. 
10 Following Manor (1995), we may characterize the Congress party structure itself as federal in nature at 
this time.  In some respects, however, Nehru’s personal authority after independence allowed him to 
dominate decision-making, as we have noted above. The pre-independence Congress was actually more 
decentralized, with provincial units playing a significant role, and provincial leaders being powerful in their 
own right, with prominent positions in the formal party hierarchy. 
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Gandhi, the more institutionalized hierarchy of the BJP, which is currently the main 
ruling party, and the emergence of explicit regional parties, which have often been 
partners in ruling coalitions in the last few years. Certainly, in the last decade, regional 
parties throughout the country have become significant as a political force. Overall, 
however, we may argue that the institutional expression of federal or centralized 
structures within political parties has not been a major independent factor in shaping 
India’s federal system, because other forms of central control, administrative, legal and 
fiscal, have mattered more.11  As an example of central control, Article 356 of the 
Constitution has been used quite liberally to replace or suspend elected state governments 
that were deemed unsatisfactory by the central government.12 
 
More recently, following a provision in Article 263 of the Constitution, and 
recommendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission in 1969 and the Sarkaria 
Commission on Center-State Relations in 1988, the Inter-State Council (ISC) was created 
in 1990, and has become a forum where some political and economic issues of joint 
concern can be collectively discussed and possibly resolved. The ISC includes the Prime 
Minister, state Chief Ministers, and several central cabinet ministers as members. While 
the ISC is merely advisory, and has been viewed as weak – especially since central 
governing coalitions give regional parties more direct say in policy (Majeed, 2002) – it 
has formalized collective discussion and approval of several important matters impinging 
on India’s federal arrangements, including tax sharing and inter-state water disputes.13 
Another, similar, body is older than the ISC, but narrower in scope. The National 
Development Council (NDC) serves as a forum for bargaining over five year plan 
allocations (see below). The NDC is chaired by the Prime Minister, and its members 
include all cabinet ministers at the center, Chief Ministers of the states, and members of 
the Planning Commission. 
  
The next level of governance that embodies aspects of federal structures is the 
bureaucracy. Just as elected politicians ideally act as agents of their constituents, 
bureaucrats in turn act as the agents of elected officials.  Bureaucrats, as career 
                                                 
11 There are many nuances that this conclusion glosses over. See Rao and Singh (2001) for a more detailed 
discussion. 
12 The use of Article 356 appeared often to violate the spirit of the provision, which was designed for 
situations of government breakdown. It was in invoking Article 356 that state governors became direct 
agents of the Prime Minister. Often, removal of a state government was followed by lengthy direct rule by 
the central government. Interestingly, the central government has retreated substantially from this approach 
in the last few years, helped by a stand taken by the President at the time. 
13 Sáez (2002) provides a detailed history of the conception and creation of the ISC, as well as an 
assessment of its working to date (Chapter 4). In his conclusion, he characterizes the ISC as ‘a 
disappointment’ and ‘far from being effective’ (p. 216). While he is right in pointing out the many 
weaknesses and failures of the ISC, particularly with respect to changing Article 356, or enabling 
implementation of its many recommendations, we have noted instances of its usefulness in developing 
agreement on specific institutional reforms that have federalist dimensions. Kapur (2001) provides other 
examples as well. To understand precisely where the ISC plays a positive role, note that it has not 
succeeded in implementing its own, independent agenda, but is able to facilitate intergovernmental 
agreement on issues brought to the table by the center. In Section 5, we discuss the potential for expanding 
such a role, contra Sáez’s view of the ISC as ‘emblematic of a broader failure of inter-governmental 
institutions in India’ (p. 216). 
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employees, are partly insulated from political whims and pressures, but ultimately in a 
democracy must be subordinate to elected representatives.  Therefore a unitary, 
hierarchical bureaucracy cannot by itself negate a federal political structure in the same 
way that a powerful, centralized, national political party might.  However, a centralized 
bureaucracy can act as the agent of such a political party, against the requirements of a 
federal system.  There are elements of such action in the workings of Indian bureaucracy.  
 
The Indian bureaucracy is provided constitutional recognition.  The central and state level 
tiers of the “public services” are given shape through the provisions of Part XIV of the 
Constitution. Since each political layer of government requires its own administrative 
apparatus, any bureaucracy in a federation will have a federal character.  In particular, 
state governments must be able to appoint and dismiss14 bureaucrats to implement state-
level policies. This is certainly the case in India, where there is a central bureaucracy as 
well as an independent bureaucracy in each state.   
 
The key component of the bureaucracy is the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). IAS 
members are chosen by a centralized process, and trained together.  However, they are 
then assigned to particular states, and become, technically as well as in most practical 
matters, members of a state-level bureaucratic hierarchy as well.  While an IAS 
member’s entire early career is spent within the home state, and senior appointments at 
the state level carry considerable power and prestige, the greatest attraction lies with 
appointments within the central government.  The structure of the IAS was designed as a 
compromise between the desire to have an effective apparatus at the state level, where 
most of the tasks of day-to-day administration, development, and law and order were 
assigned by the Constitution, and, on the other hand, the fear of promoting regional 
loyalties over national ones (with the further fear of national disintegration). However, 
this compromise has been somewhat problematic for the working of federalism, since 
conflicts arise between state and central politicians (the latter acting through IAS 
members assigned to the central government) in directing state-level IAS bureaucrats. 
  
At the national and state levels, the judiciary constitutes a distinct branch of government, 
though the legislative branch influences appointments.  At the local level, IAS members 
are vested with some judicial authority. In judging whether the law was broken and who 
broke the law, the judiciary acts as a specialized agent of elected officials who frame 
laws. The higher levels of the judiciary also act as judges of the laws themselves, within 
the context of the overarching legal and constitutional framework.   
   
The Supreme Court stands at the top of the Indian judicial hierarchy.  Its powers include 
broad original and appellate jurisdiction and the right to pass on the constitutionality of 
laws passed by Parliament.  In practice, there has been conflict between the Supreme 
Court and the legislature/executive over the scope of these powers, and their boundaries 
remain subject to bargaining, though one can generalize that the Court has been 
                                                 
14 In practice, dismissal is almost impossible, something that is true for the entire organized sector in India. 
However, state governments use (and misuse) the power to transfer bureaucrats to assert political control 
over the bureaucracy. 
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overshadowed by the central legislative/executive branch.15 The President, in 
consultation with the Prime Minister, appoints Justices of the Court.  At the state level, 
below the Supreme Court, are the High Courts.  Each High Court’s justices are appointed 
by the President, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the 
state’s Governor.  Paralleling the situation at the Center, the state’s Chief Minister is in a 
position to influence the Governor's advice.  High courts also have both original and 
appellate jurisdiction.  In addition, they superintend the work of all courts within the 
state, including district courts, as well as various courts subordinate to the district courts.  
These subordinate courts are specialized, with smaller civil matters being separated out 
from criminal cases, for example.  Criminal cases are dealt with in magistrates’ courts, 
where IAS members serve.  
  
The formal judiciary, therefore, is a well-defined hierarchy, with a relatively clear 
assignment of tasks.  This assignment and hierarchy are overly centralized, because not 
enough matters are disposed of at lower level courts.  This reflects a lack of resources 
devoted to lower level courts (though the resource problem exists at all levels), as well as 
a centralized assignment of scope of jurisdictions. The problem is compounded by the 
nature of the appeals process, and by the failure of higher-level courts to control 
appeals.16  Also, judges below the state level are typically not appointed by local 
government officials, representing a significant departure from a federal system below 
the state level.   
 
The inefficiencies of the judicial system in India reflect inadequate decentralization 
within the judiciary itself, but also inadequate delegation of powers by the 
legislative/executive branch.  In particular, the expansion of state intervention in the 
economy that occurred in the first three decades after independence, with the central 
government encroaching on the states’ assignments, was effectively outside judicial 
review. 17 Inadequate judicial power is a constitutional problem, because this delegation 
is absent in some of the particulars of the Constitution. A weaker central legislature in the 
1990s appears to be allowing the Supreme Court to play a more effective checking role. 
However it does not solve the resource allocation problems that must be corrected for 
smoother working of day-to-day judicial functions.18   
                                                 
15 In early constitutional decisions, the Court placed fairly narrow limits on the power of the legislature to 
amend the Constitution, and in specific instances, has allowed the center to extend its powers over the 
states quite liberally (see footnotes 8, 12, 17 and 19). The executive, particularly under Indira Gandhi, has 
also tried to control judicial appointments to its advantage. Many of the broader issues of federal 
institutions are being considered by the current Constitutional Review Commission of India. 
16 ‘Public interest petitions’ to the higher courts, while democracy enhancing in spirit, have also sometimes 
been used for obstructionist purposes to benefit particular interest groups. 
17 Furthermore, the 42
nd Amendment in 1976, during the Emergency declared by Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi, moved the “Administration of justice; constitution and organization of all courts, except the 
Supreme Court and the High Courts” from the State List to the Concurrent List. 
18 The pressure for correction might come from competition among subnational jurisdictions pursuing 
commercial motives. As states and localities try to attract investment and commercial activity, they may 
come under pressure to provide supportive judicial systems. This argument applies to contract enforcement, 
or property rights enforcement more broadly, more than to the criminal justice system. In this respect, the 
lack of training of India’s lawyers and judges in even rudimentary economics has sometimes led to judicial 
decisions with substantial negative impacts on the economy, as in judicial interpretations of labor laws. 
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Finally, the police have a special role, involving both the bureaucracy and the judicial 
system.  Ideally, the police are impartial investigators and monitors, preventing violations 
of law where possible, and complementing the judiciary in enforcement.  However, the 
police are also organized as a bureaucracy under the control of politicians – like other 
branches of administration, but unlike the judiciary, with its notional independence.  The 
actual functioning of the police in India has become subject to politicization and the 
encroachment of the central government into law and order, constitutionally a state 
subject.19 India has a variety of central and state police forces, with the Indian Police 
Service (IPS), the superior officer cadre, being organized on similar dual lines to the IAS. 
This puts its members on a different footing than members of state police forces, who are 
recruited directly by state governments, even though IPS officers are assigned to 
particular states.20   
 
To conclude this description, we note that the existence of different dimensions of 
governance implies that a federal political system cannot exist simply through a 
constitutional assignment of responsibilities to different layers of government.  Each level 
of government in a federal system must not only have authority to raise revenues, but it 
also must have the authority to carry out decisions made at that level.  In India, the IAS, 
the IPS and the judiciary are all perhaps more centralized than they need to be, given the 
current federal political system.  While independent India began with a relatively 
circumscribed federal model, independent political competition at the state government 
level has thrived in recent years.  This decentralization has not been fully matched in the 
other dimensions of government, but may need to be for a more effective federal system 
to operate. The growing relative importance of regional parties, coupled with the 
tendency for regional concentration of ‘national’ parties such as the BJP and Congress, 
appears to be leading to some change in this direction.21 
Assignments and Transfers 
Assignments of authority include important non-fiscal dimensions, as we have briefly 
discussed in the context of politics, administration and law. However, control over how 
public resources are raised and spent represents a crucial aspect of any federal system. 
We describe the tax and expenditure assignments that form the basis of India’s fiscal 
federal institutions, and consider the system of center-state transfers that results from, and 
complements the assignment of fiscal authorities in India. We also consider the nature of 
intergovernmental loans, and their importance as implicit transfers. 
 
                                                 
19 Item 2A in the Union List, inserted by the 42
nd Amendment, gives the center power to deploy “any other 
force subject to the control of the Union.” This need not always be a negative: for example, state 
governments may fail to protect minority rights, as in the case of Gujarat in 2002 – however, there the 
central government also failed to act. 
20 For example, recently the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, J. Jayalalitha, came into conflict with the center 
over the posting of IPS officers in her state. 
21 A separate issue from the degree of decentralization in federal administrative structures is that of 
corruption. While it can be argued that decentralization increases the inefficiency of corruption, which is 
pervasive at all levels, this is not a logically necessary consequence. See Singh (2004) for a discussion of 
these issues. 
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The Indian Constitution, in its Seventh Schedule, assigns the powers and functions of the 
center and the states. The schedule specifies the exclusive powers of the center in the 
Union list; exclusive powers of the states in the State list; and those falling under the joint 
jurisdiction are placed in the Concurrent list.  All residuary powers are assigned to the 
center.  The nature of the assignments is fairly typical of federal nations, and broadly fits 
with economist’s theoretical rationale.22  The functions of the central government are 
those required to maintain macroeconomic stability, international trade and relations, and 
those having implications for more than one state.  The major subjects assigned to the 
states comprise public order, public health, agriculture, irrigation, land rights, fisheries 
and industries and minor minerals. The States also assume a significant role for subjects 
in the concurrent list such as education and transportation, social security and social 
insurance.  
 
The assignment of tax powers in India is based on a principle of separation, i.e., tax 
categories are exclusively assigned either to the center or to the states.  Most broad-based 
(in principle though not in practice) taxes have been assigned to the center, including 
taxes on income and wealth from non-agricultural sources, corporation tax, taxes on 
production (excluding those on alcoholic liquors) and customs duty. A long list of taxes 
is assigned to the states.  However, only the tax on the sale and purchase of goods has 
been significant for state revenues.  This narrow effective tax base is largely a result of 
political economy factors that have eroded or prevented the use of taxes on agricultural 
land or incomes by state governments. The center has also been assigned all residual 
powers, which implies that taxes not mentioned in any of the lists automatically fall into 
its domain. 
 
The tax assignment system has some notable anomalies.  The separation of income tax 
powers between the center and states based on whether the source of income is 
agriculture or non-agriculture has opened up avenues for both avoidance and evasion of 
the personal income tax.  Second, even though in a legal sense taxes on production 
(central manufacturing excises) and sale (state sales taxes) are separate, they tax the same 
                                                 
22 Economic theories of government are based on the idea that public (non-rival and non-exclusive) goods 
are not well provided by the market mechanism.  This does not in itself justify a federal governance 
structure.  However, if governments are not perfectly informed and intrinsically benevolent, subnational 
governments may be better able to judge the desired levels of local public goods, and, potentially, can be 
given more specific electoral incentives to do so than national governments.  The assignment of 
expenditure responsibilities then follows, taking account of economies of scale, access to resources, and 
externalities or spillovers. With respect to revenue authority, tax assignments are what matter as a first 
approximation (neglecting intergenerational issues), since the interest on borrowing must also come out of 
taxes.  Allocational efficiency is the usual starting point here.  For example, mobility across jurisdictions 
makes it harder for subnational jurisdictions to raise revenue from taxes than for the central government. Of 
course for internationally mobile factors, even national jurisdictions face problems in collecting taxes.  
Also, mobility depends on the relative benefits provided through public expenditures, so that jurisdictions 
can counter mobility by providing appropriate benefits at the margin to those who are taxed. Finally, tax 
coordination by subnational jurisdictions can be an effective alternative to central assignment (see Section 
5). If efficiency implies that more taxes should be collected by the center, there will be a mismatch between 
revenues and expenditures for subnational jurisdictions. The result of the differing determinants of optimal 
assignments of expenditure and tax authorities can be a “vertical fiscal imbalance”, where subnational 
governments rely on the center for revenue transfers.   
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base, causing overlapping and leaving less tax room to the latter. Finally, the states are 
allowed to levy taxes on the sale and purchase of goods (entry 54 in the State list) but not 
services.  This, besides providing avenues for tax evasion and avoidance, has also posed 
problems in designing and implementing a comprehensive value added tax (VAT), as 
discussed further in Section 5.  
 
The realized outcome of the Indian assignments of tax and expenditure authority, their 
particular history of implementation, and the response of different levels of government 
and tax payers to the assignment has been a substantial vertical fiscal imbalance. In 1998-
99, the states on average raised about 35 percent of total revenues, but incurred about 57 
percent of total expenditures.23  The balance was made up by transfers from the center: 
perverse fiscal incentives for the states in this system have, in fact, increased the 
imbalance. Moreover, the ability of the states to finance their current expenditures from 
their own sources of revenues has tended to decline over time, from 69 per cent in 1955-
56 to about 55 per cent in the 1990s. In terms of total expenditure, the states were even 
more dependent on the center, with only 44 percent of their overall spending being 
covered by own revenue in 1998-99. 
 
The Constitution recognized that its assignment of tax powers and expenditure functions 
would create imbalances between expenditure ‘needs’ and abilities to raise revenue.  The 
imbalances could be both vertical, among different levels of government, and horizontal, 
among different units within a sub-central level.  Therefore, the Constitution provided for 
the sharing of the proceeds of certain centrally levied taxes (e.g., non-corporate income 
tax, Article 270; and Union excise duty, Article 272) with the states, as well as grants to 
the states from the Consolidated Fund of India.  Recent constitutional changes in this 
scheme have simplified this sharing arrangement, and are discussed in section 5.24  The 
shares of the center and the states, and their allocation among different states are 
determined by the Finance Commission, which is also a constitutional creation, and is 
appointed by the President of India every five years (or earlier if needed). In addition to 
tax devolution, the Finance Commission is also required to recommend grants to the 
states in need of assistance under Article 275. 
 
So far, eleven Finance Commissions have made recommendations and, barring a few 
exceptions, these have been accepted by the central government.  However, the 
methodology and processes of these Commissions have been criticized.  The main 
criticisms are (i) the scope of the Finance Commissions through the Presidential terms of 
reference has been too restricted; and (ii) the design of their transfer schemes has reduced 
state government incentives for fiscal discipline (through ‘gap-filling’ transfers), while 
doing relatively little to reduce inter-state inequities. Note that larger government deficits 
at the subnational level and, to some extent, increases in inter-state inequalities in the last 
decade, are related to the functioning of India’s intergovernmental transfer system. We 
shall return to these issues in section 6. 
 
                                                 
23 See Rao and Singh (2002), Table 1. Figures for subsequent years are quite similar. 
24 Seignorage revenue of the central government is not recognized in the Constitution, and is not shared 
with the states. 
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While the Finance Commission decides on tax shares and makes grants, a separate body, 
the Planning Commission, makes grants and loans (in the ratio 30:70 for the major states) 
for implementing development plans.  Historically, as development planning gained 
emphasis, the Planning Commission became a major dispenser of such funds to the 
states.  As there is no specific provision in the Constitution for such plan transfers25, the 
central government channeled them under the miscellaneous, and ostensibly limited 
provisions of Article 282.  Before 1969, plan transfers were project-based. Since then, the 




The Planning Commission works out five-year-plan investments for each sector of the 
economy and each state.  With this as background, the states work out their respective 
annual plans for each year, based on estimated resource availability, which potentially 
includes the balance from current revenue (including Finance Commission transfers), 
contributions of public enterprises, additional resource mobilization, plan grants and 
loans, market borrowings, and other miscellaneous capital receipts. At this stage, a 
certain amount of bargaining for resources goes on through the NDC as well as in state-
by-state discussions, to determine plan loans and grants. At the end of this process, the 
Planning Commission approves the state plans.  
 
Finally, various ministries give grants to their counterparts in the states for specified 
projects, either wholly funded by the center (central sector projects) or requiring the 
states to share a proportion of the cost (centrally sponsored schemes). The ostensible 
rationale for these programs is financing activities with a high degree of inter-state 
spillovers, or which are merit goods (e.g., poverty alleviation and family planning), but 
they are often driven by pork-barrel objectives.27 These projects are supposed to be 
monitored by the Planning Commission, and coordinated with the overall state plans.  
 
There are over 100 such schemes, and several attempts in the past to consolidate them 
into broad sectoral programs have not been successful. These programs have provided the 
central government with an instrument to actively influence states’ spending, replacing 
the pre-1969 plan transfers in this role. The proliferation of schemes may also have 
increased the size and control of the bureaucracy.  While the NDC recently appointed an 
investigative committee, which recommended scaling down and consolidating centrally 
sponsored schemes, implementation of this was weak. 
 
In addition to explicit transfers, intergovernmental loans, to the extent that they are 
subsidized, also constitute transfers to subnational governments. Ideally, borrowing 
should be to finance investment, but the state governments have increasingly used 
borrowing to meet current expenditure needs (approaching 50 percent in 1998-99). State 
governments can only borrow from the market with central government approval if they 
are indebted to the center, and this constraint binds for all the states. Central loans now 
                                                 
25 The Planning Commission was established by a Cabinet resolution, and the constitutionality of its 
transfers has, in fact, been questioned. 
26
 The ‘Gadgil formula’ is named after the Deputy Chairman of the Commission in 1969. 
27 For example, they can be for very specific local projects, and can have conditionalities such as 
employment requirements. 
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constitute about 60 percent of the states’ indebtedness, with another 22 percent being 
market borrowing, and the remainder made up of pension funds, shares of rural small 
savings, and required holdings of state government bonds by commercial banks (Rao and 
Singh, 2002; Srinivasan, 2002). While these captive sources of finance are limited, the 
states have been able to soften their budget constraints further by off-budget borrowing or 
nonpayment by their public sector enterprises (PSEs). For example, the State Electricity 
Boards (SEBs) have been tardy in paying the National Thermal Power Corporation, a 
central PSE (Srinivasan, 2002). 
 
There are other sources of softness in state government budget constraints. The central 
government guarantees loans made to state government PSEs by external agencies. The 
center has also in the past forgiven loans made to state governments, presumably to gain 
political advantage. Even in the case of attempts to impose conditions on state borrowing 
that would encourage fiscal reforms, the center has not been able to harden budget 
constraints. In particular, in 1999-2000, eleven states signed Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOUs) with the center, promising fiscal reforms in exchange for ways 
and means advances (essentially, overdrafts) on tax devolution and grants due to them. In 
some cases, however, the center has had to convert these advances into three-year loans. 
The Reserve Bank reports stopping payments to three states (Reserve Bank, 2001), but 
the political difficulty of not bailing out states that are both poor and populous is 
obvious.28 In section 5, we will connect up these problems with implicit as well as 




4. National vs. Subnational Reforms 
Manufacturing 
One result of greater openness since 1991 has been increased competition for Indian 
manufacturing. Ahluwalia (2002b) notes that Indian firms have upgraded technology and 
expanded to more efficient scales of production over the last decade. Among larger firms, 
there have been substantial changes in relative size, indicating a dynamism that was 
absent before the reforms. Despite these positive signs, India’s manufacturing growth has 
been modest, and manufacturing exports have also not taken off. Many authors have 
noted the fact that India’s rates of protection are still relatively high, contributing to a 
high cost of production. Continued federal and state level controls on product markets 
substantially hinder the growth of this sector. Rigid labor laws and poor infrastructure are 
other contributing factors to low productivity and high costs, as are rigidities such as 
small-scale industry reservations.29  
 
While many of the problems of Indian industry can be traced to laws at the national level, 
it is becoming clear that state level reforms are also needed. For example, a study by 
                                                 
28 These kinds of political considerations also constrain the center to make plan loans at the same interest 
rate to all states, removing that marginal incentive device as well. In this context, the ISC may have a 
greater role to play in constructing a broader bargain with respect to reform, as we discuss in Section 5. 
29 Significant progress on this front has been made very recently – see Mohan (2002a). 
  16Indian Federalism, Economic Reform and Globalization, Nirvikar Singh and T. N. Srinivasan 
McKinsey & Company (McKinsey Global Institute, 2001) suggests, that, starting from a 
base of 5.5 percent GDP growth for India, reforms at the state level can add 2 percentage 
points to growth, almost as much as their estimate of the potential contribution of further 
reforms by the central government (2.6 percentage points). The McKinsey report 
identifies the top three roadblocks to higher growth as product market barriers, land 
market barriers, and government ownership. In the case of land markets in particular, 
state or local-level controls on land use, including protected tenancies, rent controls and 
zoning restrictions, are quite significant.30  
 
The situation is complicated by the fact that state laws may piggyback, or be enabled by, 
central level legislation. Reform therefore requires a coordinated approach, since the 
center is often not in a position to nullify state legislation directly. In the case of labor 
laws, the main legislation is at the national level, in the form of the Industrial Disputes 
Act of 1947, the Industrial Employment Act of 1946, and the Contract Labour (Abolition 
and Regulation) Act of 1970. The national laws require firms with more than 100 
workers to get the permission of state governments for closing plants or laying off 
workers. This permission is rarely given. However, state governments also have the right 
to restrict contract labor, and variations in their use of this power are significant. Another 
key source of variation among states is the way that worker safety laws are enforced, with 
government inspectors in some states using these laws as a significant vehicle of rent-
extraction.31 
 
Dollar, Iarossi and Mengistae (2002) have examined the quantitative impact of state-level 
variations in policy on manufacturing productivity. Using a survey of 1000 
manufacturing establishments across 10 Indian states, they find that states that are poor 
performers, and identified by survey respondents as having a ‘poor investment climate’, 
have total factor productivity (TFP) that is 26 percent lower than the high-performing 
states. About a tenth of this gap is found to be due to a higher regulatory burden 
(specifically, labor market regulations) in the worse states. The advantage of such 
quantification, of course, is that it enables a basis for policy recommendations with 
respect to subnational reforms. 
Agriculture 
Opening the economy, reducing protection of industry and exchange rate depreciation 
have all helped India’s agricultural sector by moving relative prices in its favor, and 
making exports more competitive. The growth performance of agricultural exports, as 
measured by the increase in share of world exports, has been somewhat better than that of 
manufacturing (Ahluwalia, 2002b). Nevertheless, there are significant areas where 
coordinated reforms by the center and the states can improve performance. Severe 
                                                 
30 For example, Chennai has less restrictive land use controls than Delhi or Mumbai, and has seen a faster 
growth of more efficient modern food retailing (McKinsey, 2001, p. 8). Note that inefficient and lengthy 
judicial proceedings (Section 3) compound the problems created by these and other laws.  A caveat is that 
the McKinsey methodology is somewhat vague, and its downgrading of infrastructure as a constraint may 
not be accurate. Dollar et al (2002, see further in the paper), emphasize infrastructure. 
31 Forbes (2002, Table 4.2) details 11 kinds of mostly state and local inspection (factory conditions, 
taxation, etc.) According to him, eight of these have not changed in character since 1991. 
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distortions of both input and output prices have distorted cropping patterns and hindered 
diversification into higher value-added, non-food-grain crops. Some of the price 
distortions (fertilizers, outputs) are the responsibility of the center, whereas others (water, 
electricity) are due to state governments’ subsidies. Restrictions on FDI and domestic 
distortions have also hindered development of agroprocessing industries. 
 
At the same time that subsidies are removed, farmers need to be freed from a range of 
outdated laws and institutions. Some of these laws go back in spirit to World War II-era 
scarcities. The Essential Commodities Act empowers state governments to restrict the 
movement of agricultural products across state and even district boundaries, and limit the 
stocks that food traders can hold. Various state-level Agricultural Produce Marketing 
Acts force food traders to buy produce only in regulated markets, making direct 
contractual relationships difficult, and sometimes reducing the bargaining power of 
farmers.32 These restrictions are compounded by an inefficient central government food 
procurement and distribution system (Srinivasan, 2002). Ahluwalia (2002b) suggests that, 
in such cases, the center needs to not only repeal its own restrictive laws, but also put 
limits on the laws that states can pass. From a federalist perspective, however, this may 
require explicit bargaining between the center and the states, since the latter have 
considerable constitutional authority with respect to agriculture.33 
 
Finally, the fall in investment in agricultural infrastructure is well known. It appears to 
have begun in the 1980s, before the current reforms (Gulati and Bathla, 2001). Some 
kinds of infrastructure relate to production, and require public investment, which has 
been choked off by the fiscal problems of the state governments. Other infrastructure can 
support more efficient marketing of agricultural produce. Some of it (airports, roads, etc.) 
may require public investment, but other investment may simply require removal of a 
range of outdated and often contradictory legal restrictions on agricultural trade within 
the country. A symptom of the problems of Indian agriculture is that partial liberalization 
has, in some cases, made imports of minimally processed foods, such as packaged juices 
from middle-income Asian countries, cheaper than domestic production. 
Services 
The rapid growth of India’s service sector, reflected in its increasing share of GDP (see 
Table 1) has certainly been supported by the growth of the information technology (IT) 
sector, particularly in software. The IT sector directly and indirectly demonstrates several 
possible benefits of reform. While the sector clearly benefited from the availability of the 
right human capital, and from favorable tax policies, some of the key supporting factors 
were simply the absence of crippling regulations. Since software did not come under 
many of the restrictive laws that have strangled Indian manufacturing, new firms were 
                                                 
32 Even in the richest, agricultural surplus state of Punjab, intermediaries in both the input and output 
markets often have monopolistic positions created by government regulations. Nirvikar Singh was told, by 
a state government official, of at least one case where pesticide distributors successfully lobbied the state 
government to prevent direct contracting of farmers with manufacturers, at steep discounts. 
33 The states’ constitutional authority extends to all agriculture, including agricultural education and 
research, water (supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and embankments and storage), land tenures and 
transfers of agricultural land, land improvement and agricultural loans, and fisheries 
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able to operate much more flexibly than they might have otherwise. India’s new outward 
orientation also helped, and software exports grew from $100 million in 1990-91 to $6 
billion in 2000-01 (NASSCOM, 2002a). This growth was a significant factor in India’s 
avoidance of further balance of payments problems, and by the late 1990s, probably 
contributed one percentage point to GDP growth. The IT sector also benefited from, as 
well as spurred, reforms in the telecoms sector that included substantial liberalization and 
modernization of the regulatory framework.34 
 
From a federalist perspective, the IT sector has helped to build a political constituency for 
reform at the state level, though events in 2004 suggest that this constituency is not broad 
enough to guarantee electoral success. States such as Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh have 
explicitly competed for investment in IT, through policies to develop physical and 
educational infrastructure. Other states, such as Punjab, have also tried to catch up in this 
area. However, the IT industry remains regionally concentrated.35 Whether this 
contributes to regional inequalities depends on the degree of labor mobility, both 
geographic and occupational, and access to the education system: such mobility in India, 
historically low, appears to have increased in recent years, particularly for technical 
professionals. To the extent that much of the recent growth is coming in IT-enabled 
services, which require more and less technically skilled labor, the benefits can accrue to 
a broader group, and may diffuse some of the regional concentration issues. 
Privatization, Infrastructure Development and Regulation 
Government production of private goods, its provision of public infrastructure, and its 
regulation of industry all have important implications for the performance of the Indian 
economy. The low productivity and poor return on capital of public sector enterprises 
(PSEs) in India have been well documented (e.g., McKinsey, 2001; Kapur and 
Ramamurthi, 2002). With national and state governments owning enterprises in a broad 
cross-section of industries, the scope of potential privatization is quite sweeping. The 
political difficulty of this task was behind the absence of any meaningful privatization in 
the first decade of economic reform, and though this situation improved with the creation 
of a Ministry of Disinvestment and appointment of an active minister, the change in 
national government in 2004 reversed these developments.  
 
The large implicit subsidies for those employed in public sector enterprises are an 
important aspect of the resistance to privatization, and one can guess that patronage and 
rent-seeking opportunities have contributed to the lack of political enthusiasm from 
government ministries. Also, in the case of state-level public enterprises such as the State 
Electricity Boards (SEBs), there are additional twin problems of huge deficits and the 
need for coordinated reform of the power sector (see below). The previous central 
government created the post of a Minister of State for Disinvestment, and in this position 
Arun Shourie drew up a list of 27 central PSEs to be disinvested as soon as practical. 
These include Air India, VSNL, Hindustan Copper Ltd, India Tourism Development 
Corporation, State Trading Corporation, and Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd. 
                                                 
34 See Singh (2002) for further discussion of the role of IT in India’s economic development. 
35 For example, 80% of India’s IT enabled services companies are located in only six metropolitan areas 
(NASSCOM, 2002b). 
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However, opposition within the government to disinvestment of the large oil companies, 
Bharat Petroleum and Hindustan Petroleum, led  to a postponement of their privatization, 
as well as that of other central government oil, gas and power companies, and the whole 
effort has stalled with the change in government..  
 
While the SEBs are directly owned by the state governments, center-state relations have 
also impinged on privatization when central PSEs (constituting the bulk of the assets of 
the public sector) in particular state jurisdictions have been privatized or proposed for 
privatization. Since privatization has been so limited, there are few examples, but the 
initial case served as a test. The first significant privatization that occurred was of the 
Bharat Aluminium Company (BALCO). The company’s labor unions opposed the 
privatization and went on strike. The government of the new state of Chhattisgarh (carved 
out of Madhya Pradesh) took an aggressive stance against the disinvestment. While some 
substantive issues of the fairness of the bidding and the sale of tribal land were involved, 
the case raised the potential of states obstructing privatization when the center had finally 
got it rolling.  
 
The stance of the Chief Minister may be understood in terms of responsiveness to a local 
interest group, and as an attempt to bargain for transfer payments from the center. 
However, the Supreme Court, however, finally upheld the sale of the company, and 
dismissed actions by the state government against the new private sector owners. Kapur 
and Ramamurthi (2002) have discussed the court judgment in detail, and conclude that it 
represents a significant precedent for preventing the use of legal maneuvers such as 
‘public interest legislation’ to obstruct privatization. The Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh 
subsequently actively sought further investment from the buyer of BALCO. 
 
Turning to infrastructure, the term can include various physical, social and economic 
indicators, but attention is usually focused on public and quasi-public goods such as 
electric power, irrigation, roads and railways, telecommunications and ports. In many of 
these cases, the poor quality of the available infrastructure acts as a constraint on growth 
(Dollar et al, 2002). Variations in infrastructure across states also explain a quarter of the 
difference in high-performing and low-performing states, in the sample analyzed by 
Dollar  et al. Various aggregate measures of infrastructure are possible. Table 4 
reproduces data on one such index, produced by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian 
Economy (CMIE) from Ahluwalia (2002a, Table 8). The 14 major states listed are 
ordered according to their per capita Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) in the initial 
year, from poorest to richest. The data show considerable variation across states, but also 
a remarkable amount of stability over the period, with simple correlations between any 
two years all being over 0.96, and the coefficient of variation showing a slight decline, 
from 0.35 in 1980-81 to 0.29 in 1996-97.36  
 
Infrastructure areas such as telecommunications and power have seen some privatization 
of PSEs, as well as entry by private firms. These developments require new regulatory 
structures to set and enforce the ‘rules of the game.’ These structures have been slow to 
                                                 
36 These calculations do not weight the indices by population, but weighting is unlikely to change the 
conclusion of stability. 
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develop in forms that break away from old-style bureaucratic control structures. In 
telecommunications, the creation of a new regulatory institution, the Telecoms 
Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) has been essentially at the national level, with the 
central government shaping its evolution. The TRAI has had problems in creating and 
implementing a new regulatory framework that does not involve ex ante case-by-case 
discretion (Dossani, 2002a). However, telecommunications reform has progressed 
substantially, driven in part by the success of the IT sector, which as we have noted, has 
been concentrated in just a few states.  
 
In the case of electric power, however, the federal issues with respect to regulation are 
more salient, and have made progress more difficult.37 Electric power is a concurrent 
responsibility of the center and the states. Each state has had a State Electricity Board 
(SEB) that is vertically integrated with respect to generation, transmission and 
distribution, and is part of the state government. Various political compulsions and 
inefficiencies have led to large losses by the SEBs, and they have been a major 
contributor to the states’ fiscal deficits.38 Furthermore, power generation has lagged 
seriously behind targets, and availability of reliable electric power has become a serious 
bottleneck for growth. 
 
Given the situation described above, the power sector received early attention in the 
economic reform process, with attempts to attract private participation in the power 
sector, set forth in a 1991 policy document. Over the next decade, Rs. 373 billion in FDI 
in the power sector was approved, making up 14 per cent of total approvals, but actual 
investment has lagged, with several well-publicized disputes and withdrawals by foreign 
companies, the Enron case being only the most prominent of these (Mukherjee, 2002). 
The need to dismantle the vertical integration of the power sector, the simultaneous 
involvement of the central and state governments, the lack of understanding of the 
technical details of power contracting by some of those on the Indian side, and the role of 
various interest groups all had an effect in delaying or even derailing power sector 
reform.  
 
One of biggest hurdles has been the effective bankruptcy of the SEBs, leading to foreign 
investors in generation demanding guarantees from the state governments, as owners of 
the SEBs, for payments for electricity sales to the SEBs. Since the state governments 
themselves were in financial stress, they further asked for a counter guarantee from the 
central government for payment in case the state government failed to fulfill its 
guarantee. Enron received such a guarantee and counter guarantee, and had to invoke it in 
2001, meanwhile being overtaken by larger problems of the parent company. Other 
foreign companies that had planned to invest in generation all pulled out because 
satisfactory payment arrangements could not be made. 
 
                                                 
37 See, for example, Dossani and Crow (2001), Dossani (2002b) and Sáez (2002, Chapter 6). 
38 The problem of SEB losses is worse than budget figures indicate. In 2000-01, the losses of the SEBs 
were over Rs. 260 billion of which only Rs. 60 billion were accounted for in the state budgets by way of 
explicit subsidies to the SEBs. 
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In 1997, the central and state governments tried again to coordinate reform, with a 
Common Minimum National Action Plan for Power (CMNAP). The CMNAP 
recommended corporatization of the SEBs, though within a public ownership framework, 
and the creation of independent regulatory commissions at the central and state levels. 
The CMNAP also recommended some specific regulatory approaches, and private entry 
in the distribution component of the sector. While Andhra Pradesh, Haryana and Orissa 
had already set up their own State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs), other 
states moved after the center passed legislation in 1998 to set up its Central ERC, and to 
enable the states to create their own SERCs. State governments proceeded to do this in 
1999, and some also moved forward with corporatization and some unbundling of 
generation, transmission and distribution. The delay in creating effective independent 
regulatory bodies, however, has meant that reform has proceeded in a somewhat chaotic 
manner. The regulatory commissions have not been able to establish the rules of the 
game, both because they have been pre-empted by earlier ad hoc decisions, and because 
they have not had much time to establish their own rules of operation. However, 
independent regulation and private sector participation appear to be the only way out of 
the political quicksand. 
Financial Sector Reform 
Much of financial sector reform has focused on making India’s capital markets more 
efficient. Institutional improvements such as electronic trading and settlement, and 
guidelines for corporate governance have begun to take hold. While securities market 
reforms have had the highest profile, some steps have also been taken in reforming debt 
markets and in the banking sector. Notably, a market for government debt has been 
established, and the central government now borrows at rates that are more market-
determined. In banking, there has been some reduction in interest rate controls and 
statutory requirements to invest in government securities, strengthening of prudential 
norms and regulatory oversight, and policies enabling increased competition from private 
(domestic and foreign) banks.  
 
Financial markets require some regulation, both by market participants and the 
government, and the development of modern financial regulatory institutions in India is 
still taking place.39 Many issues of financial sector reform are purely national in scope. 
However, the nature of the financial system overall involves financial repression 
(essentially, price and quantity controls in the financial sector) which in turn has had 
implications for central and state fiscal deficits. We explore this connection between 
financial sector reform and federalism. We also address the question of how much India’s 
capital markets should be opened up. While trade barriers have been reduced, and current 
account convertibility introduced, capital account convertibility remains a topic of policy 
debate. We examine this debate in the context of India’s federal finances. 
 
We noted in section 3 that fiscal deficits at the state level have increased despite the 
central government’s apparent formal authority to strictly control state borrowing. We 
identified two possible causes of this phenomenon. First, the central government has 
                                                 
39 The Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI), though it has had some missteps in trying to prevent 
market manipulation, represents a great improvement over the previous situation. 
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increasingly used discretionary loans, often with interest subsidies or even ex post 
conversion of loans to grants, as a component of political influence.40 Second, the states 
have used PSEs and other off-budget devices to run even larger deficits in practice.41 For 
both the center and the states, the ultimate enabler of both these trends has been the 
nature of India’s financial system.  
 
Severe financial repression, along with direct ownership and control of much of the 
financial system, has permitted the central government to ‘park’ central and state deficits 
in the financial system without having to print money and cause politically dangerous 
inflation. Public sector mutual funds, such as the Unit Trust of India (UTI), and financial 
intermediaries, such as the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI), have suffered 
from a combination of lack of bottom line objectives and accountability. Though the 
central government is rectifying these problems in individual cases,42 these issues 
pervade the financial sector. One simple indicator of government financial control is the 
large percentage of credit allocation by commercial banks that goes to ‘priority sectors’. 
As Table 5 shows, this ratio has not fallen appreciably since reform began, and is much 
higher than in 1969, when the banks were nationalized.43 
 
The cost of financial repression and deficit parking has been continued inefficient capital 
allocation and lower growth than might otherwise be attainable. A broad reform of the 
financial sector is required, but the constraints imposed by the web of government-
controlled financial institutions and their ‘bad’ loans to the public sector are a severe 
hurdle. If thorough financial sector reform is held back because it threatens the public 
sector house of cards, there may be a case for the government tying its hands through 
greater external liberalization of capital markets. Even without such liberalization, both 
the public sector and private financial sector in India are vulnerable to downgrading by 
international ratings agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s44, making India 
susceptible to the kinds of severe financial crisis that have affected other countries. 
                                                 
40 This statement is based on casual empiricism, but is consistent with the political effects found in formal 
quantitative analyses of explicit transfers (Rao and Singh, 2001).   
41 See also Lahiri (1999), Rao (2000b), and Mohan (2001). 
42 After two earlier bailouts, the government announced that UTI investors must bear all capital risks, but 
only after a third, costlier bailout announced in August 2002. It has also announced that the IDBI will be 
corporatized. In each case, the measures may not go far enough. Bhattacharya and Patel (2002) have made 
a strong case that incomplete reforms do nothing to deal with the moral hazard problems of India’s 
financial intermediation sector. If anything, the problems may have increased in recent years. However, 
unlike the case of Argentina, India’s state governments cannot directly borrow from banks that they own – 
nationalized banks are central government owned, though there are small cooperative banks effectively 
controlled by state governments. 
43 Shankar Acharya has pointed out to us that this observation must be qualified by noting that the 
definition of ‘priority sector’ has expanded somewhat over time. 
44 For example Standard & Poor’s lowered its long-term local currency rating to ‘BBB-‘ from ‘BBB’ and 
revised its outlook on local and foreign currency to negative in August 2001, citing ‘the continued 
deterioration of the government's financial profile, with persistently high fiscal deficits resulting in a rising 
burden of public debt.’ On September 19, 2002, it further downgraded India to BB+, citing similar reasons. 
(www.standardandpoors.com/RatingsActions/RatingsNews/Sovereigns/index.html). While ratings are 
notoriously imperfect, having failed to predict, for example, the 1997 financial crisis in South Korea and 
Thailand, they do influence foreign investors. 
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However, whether capital account liberalization can be a mechanism for financial sector 
and fiscal discipline probably depends on continued improvements in regulatory 
oversight.45 
 
In suggesting greater exposure to global markets as a disciplining device for the Indian 
public and private finances, we are not neglecting other policy avenues. For example, the 
Eleventh Finance Commission, given a much broader charge than previous commissions, 
recommended a slew of measures to promote fiscal discipline: an overall ceiling of 
37.5% of gross receipts of the Center for all transfers to the states; hard budget 
constraints for all levels of government with respect to wages and salaries; ‘greater 
autonomy’ along with hard budget constraints for public sector enterprises; more explicit 
controls on debt levels for state governments; and improvements in budgeting, auditing 
and control.46  It is not at all clear, however, that “greater autonomy along with hard 
budget constraints for public sector enterprises” will work in the absence of greater 
competitive discipline. Furthermore, by not working, it will continue to undermine any 
limits on states’ debt levels. In addition to external competition, internal competition in 
the financial sector is also necessary, and here privatization of public sector assets must 
be considered.47 
 
Financial sector privatization, which requires central action, can affect the nature of the 
demand for credit by reducing politically motivated subsidies, and by reducing overall 
interest rates through a reduction in government crowding out of private borrowing. The 
other side of the equation concerns the supply of credit. Deficit parking has been abetted 
by the existence and operation of public sector financial institutions. The need for 
privatization applies to these as well. Where does this leave the different levels of 
government with respect to financing the urgent needs for public infrastructure? One 
might argue against privatization of the financial sector if the past approach of public 
subsidies and directed lending had been successful in efficiently and effectively building 
such infrastructure: in fact, it has failed badly. In any case, fiscal incentives can be used 
to direct lending, without public ownership, potentially increasing transparency and 
efficiency. 
 
In the context of federalism, privatization in the financial sector not only can have direct 
impacts on efficiency and growth, but it can also support the goal of allowing explicit 
                                                 
45 As Pranab Bardhan has emphasized to us, and as significant instances of accounting fraud continue to 
emerge in the United States, the private sector also is subject to moral hazard in the absence of effective 
oversight. 
46 Institutional mechanisms to detail and implement such recommendations include an Expenditure 
Reforms Commission, which has issued a series of reports, and a Fiscal Responsibility Act, which has been 
passed, followed by a task force report detailing implementation. Several states have also passed similar 
laws, though their enforceability remains to be seen.  
47 Note that the center-state issue with respect to the working of the financial sector has not been just one of 
levels of credit, but also of credit allocation across states. Hence, our discussion of fiscal deficits also 
relates to concerns about political economy influences and growing interstate disparities.  In fact, the 
problem grew after the nationalization of commercial banks in 1969, which concentrated economic power 
in the hands of the center.  With insurance and many other financial institutions already under central 
control, the central government became a virtual monopolist in the financial sector.   
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center-state transfers to meet their own objectives – particularly that of enhancing 
horizontal equity – more effectively, by limiting implicit transfers. With respect to 
transfers for capital purposes, while central and state governments will always have the 
option of making conditional grants and project loans to lower level governments, the 
practical limitations on monitoring and incentive provision for such transfers (including 
the ultimate fungibility of transferred funds) suggest the greater use of unconditional 
block grants, with marginal capital funds coming through market borrowing.48 We take 
this up further in Section 5.  
Foreign Direct Investment 
Privatization, foreign capital flows, and infrastructure development all intersect in the 
realm of foreign direct investment (FDI). An important part of the Indian economic 
reform agenda has been to attract greater levels of FDI, especially that which will bring in 
new technology and improve infrastructure. While there are still restrictions on sectors 
where FDI is allowed (e.g., retailing and wholesale trading), limits on FDI in other 
sectors (e.g., telecoms, banking, insurance and civil aviation) and the government 
approval process can still be time-consuming49, cumulative FDI approvals have crossed 
$20 billion for the last decade, though actual investment is quite a bit lower. A major 
policy shift allowed state governments to directly seek FDI, rather than having the central 
government be the only channel. As a result, state governments have actively competed 
for FDI, though with results that have varied dramatically across states.50 In that respect, 
FDI has more transparent regional impacts than foreign portfolio investment, which was 
allowed from 1993 onward. In terms of magnitude, portfolio investment has been quite 
significant, in the order of $20 billion since liberalization. 
 
In September 2002, the committee on FDI headed by N.K. Singh recommended raising 
FDI limits in some sectors, opening up others to FDI, removing some exit barriers, 
improving targeting of potential investors, and facilitating approvals. The last would 
come about through several administrative and legal changes that would provide a more 
integrated approval process at both the central and state levels. In particular, the 
committee recommended that individual states also streamline and integrate their 
approval processes, covering environmental clearances, industrial relations and worker 
health. Some of these recommendations, however, were confined to Special Economic 
                                                 
48 Obviously, the smaller the government, the less will be the feasibility of significant reliance on the 
market. However, as we have emphasized earlier, many of the Indian states are comparable to countries in 
terms of population size and fiscal domain. The possibility of market borrowing raises issues of 
institutional reform to allow indebted state governments to seek funds in the capital market without 
permission from higher level governments, as well as the need for a credit rating agency to rate state 
governments. Credit rating in India is in its infancy, but is developing rapidly (for example, see 
www.icraindia.com). 
49 There are two FDI approval routes. Automatic approval through the central bank, for certain categories, 
is supposed to take only two weeks.  The bulk of FDI approvals, however, come through the Foreign 
Investment Promotion Board (FIPB), which is discretionary, and takes several weeks more at a minimum. 
Sáez (2002) also characterizes approval processes as ‘still cumbersome’ (p. 226).  
50 In some cases, state governments have been less than enthusiastic, whereas in others they have faced 
their own obstacles. Sáez (2002) discusses some of these problems in the context of FDI in the power 
sector. 
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Zones. It is arguable whether the precise relaxations of limits proposed are optimal or 
likely to be effective (Roy, 2002; Jha, 2002), and the potential impacts in the absence of 
further domestic financial sector reform may be a cause for concern (Jha, 2002). As in the 
case of disinvestment, political opposition has surfaced, and even consideration of the 
report by the Cabinet – let alone implementation – has stalled. Despite these roadblocks, 
the overall direction of the proposals represents a significant conceptual step with respect 
to facilitating FDI, and they continue to be on the table with the new national 
government.  
 
Statewise data for total FDI approvals for the ‘reform decade’ 1991-2001 are presented in 
Table 6. Using the 1991 population figures from the census of India, we also calculate 
per capita approvals. The simple correlation of the per capita FDI approvals with the 
infrastructure index for any of the three years in Table 5 is very low (less than 0.1). To 
some extent, this reflects the unreliability of FDI approvals as an indicator of actual 
investment, but more importantly, this is a consequence of the particular infrastructure 
index used, in which, for example, a state such as Karnataka is measured as having very 
low infrastructure development, despite its concentration of workers with high levels of 
technical skills. Most significantly, the coefficient of variation for the per capita FDI 
approvals (using population weighted measures of mean and standard deviation) is 0.93, 
which is much higher than the corresponding measure for the infrastructure index. Thus it 
appears that FDI is seeking a few favored locations, with a concentration even more than 
would be dictated by broad infrastructure measures. At least one important determinant 
of the intended destinations of FDI has been the success of India’s IT sector, which was 
discussed above. 
 
To the extent that variations in FDI across states are influenced by specific policy 
initiatives and narrowly focused government investments in infrastructure, such as might 
be the case in Karnataka, there is scope for state governments to compete more 
effectively for FDI that might have a longer-term impact on infrastructure. For example, 
Punjab, with the highest index of infrastructure, lags substantially in FDI, but might 
conceivably correct this with policy adjustments.  In general, the result of economic 
reform has been to remove central efforts to direct the location of FDI, as well as to relax 
restrictions on its nature and amount. The regional concentration of FDI is less of a 
concern if labor mobility is sufficient to ensure that workers can go where new jobs are 
created, and if public resources are channeled in ways that allow basic social 
infrastructure such as urban sanitation to complement private sector investments in 
aspects of infrastructure such as telecommunications, where the private returns to be 
captured are potentially higher. In Section 5, we return to the impacts and implications of 
the regional concentration of FDI in India. 
  
 
5. Intergovernmental Relations 
Center-State Transfers 
We outlined some of the problems with the current transfer system in the previous two 
sections. What are possible reforms that can be made in the transfer system? One 
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example of the process of reform comes from the case of tax sharing arrangements. The 
Constitution specified certain categories of centrally collected taxes that were to be 
shared with the states, according to criteria to be determined by the Finance Commission. 
In particular, personal income taxes were a major component of tax transfers from the 
center to the states, which received 87.5% of such tax revenues. On the other hand, 
income tax surcharges were kept entirely by the center. Academic commentators 
suggested that there were obvious incentive problems with such arrangements, and the 
Tenth Finance Commission recommended alternative arrangements whereby a proportion 
of overall central tax revenues would be devolved to the states. This required bargaining 
and agreement among the center and the states, as well as a constitutional amendment, 
but this has all been accomplished.51 
 
Tax sharing between the center and the states reflects one dimension of the bargaining 
that must take place among a federation’s constituents. Presumably, the initial effect of 
the change will be to leave the overall shares of the center and the states in aggregate near 
their previous values, avoiding the problem of creating clear initial losers from the 
reform. Principles of this sort might be used to tackle a harder problem, that of revising 
the formulae used to divide the states’ share of tax revenue among them. These formulae 
are quite complex, without embodying any clearly defined objective, either of interstate 
(horizontal) equity, or of provision of incentives for fiscal prudence.  
 
Given that there are other transfer mechanisms as well, and that those will be used with 
discretion, there is a case for the Finance Commission overhauling its formulae 
completely, to achieve greater simplicity. Such an overhaul can in theory be designed to 
respect the present status quo to a great extent, but to deal more directly with horizontal 
inequities in fiscal capacity (appropriately defined to avoid soft budget constraints). This 
is preferable to ad hoc grants for poorer states, made at the margin. In this respect, one 
welcome change related to tax sharing is recommended in the Eleventh Finance 
Commission report. This is the reversal of the earlier practice of keeping a portion of 
shareable tax revenues from Union excise duties exclusively for allocation among states 
according to the amount of their estimated post-tax-devolution deficits, which amounted 
to converting part of the tax share into “gap-filling” grants, lacking both in transparency 
and incentives for fiscal prudence. Stopping that practice is a small step toward hardening 
the states’ budget constraints. 
 
The case for reform of transfer formulae also applies to those Planning Commission 
transfers that are calculated on the basis of the 1969 Gadgil formula. The past scope of 
Finance Commissions has been much narrower than what the Constitution of India 
implies for their role.52  Moving away from this restriction, one welcome innovation in 
the Eleventh Finance Commission’s terms of reference was the consideration of the 
overall fiscal position of India’s federal system. The Commission recommended a 
                                                 
51 See Rao and Singh (2001) for further detail on the new arrangements, as well as initial implementation 
by the Eleventh Finance Commission. 
52 According to Article 280, the Finance Commission’s duties include recommendations with regard to 
“grants-in-aid of the revenues of the States out of the Consolidated Fund of India”, which appears to 
include Planning Commission grants made under Article 282. 
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reassessment of plan transfer formulae, with this task to be brought within the scope of 
the Finance Commission.53 It also noted the severe muddle with respect to Planning 
Commission transfers, with economically meaningless distinctions between plan and 
non-plan categories of expenditure. It recommended reform of the financing of the plans 
so that plan revenue expenditure is financed from available revenue receipts after meeting 
non-plan expenditure, with borrowing used only for investments. Finally, a 
recommendation for rolling multi-year budgeting could presumably be a step away from 
the less flexible plan cycle.54  
 
These proposed reforms would not solve problems of increasing inter-state inequalities 
(see below). However, they would make the formal transfer system clearer and simpler, 
and make it easier to understand its objectives and its impacts. Removing a significant 
portion of center-state transfers outside the political economy arena, clearly targeting 
them toward horizontal equity objectives, and doing so in a manner that does not create 
perverse incentives for recipients, is feasible and desirable in itself.  
 
Of course, there are many other influences on the fiscal positions of the states. Rao, 
Shand and Kalirajan (1999) have noted the important impacts on state SDPs of implicit 
transfers and of private sector investment flows: the causality is two-way, with both these 
tending to favor the better-off states. They also point out the unknown regional effects of 
direct central government expenditures. In Section 3, we discussed the problems created 
by soft budget constraints in the dimension of loans made to the states through the 
Planning Commission and other avenues. Just tackling tax sharing and related transfers 
will still leave these problems open. The Eleventh Finance Commission’s 
recommendation of an overall transfer ceiling of 37.5% does not seem to deal with loans 
and implicit transfers. 
 
One might, in fact, question whether the Planning Commission is appropriate in an 
economy where liberalization has taken hold. Where there is a justification for national 
level coordination because of externalities that cross state borders (as in the case of roads 
or power, for example), different central ministries and/or state governments can 
negotiate and cooperate directly. Where there is no such justification, formulaic transfers, 
determined by the Finance Commission so as not to distort states’ fiscal incentives, seem 
sufficient. The Planning Commission would be largely redundant in such an institutional 
framework. Srinivasan (2002) has suggested replacing it with two institutions analogous 
to the World Bank (IBRD) and the International Development Authority (IDA), making 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ loans respectively to richer and poorer states. While this would clarify 
the objectives of such ‘transfers’, as targeted for capital spending (something that has 
become lost in the current working of the Planning Commission), it would still be subject 
to monitoring and commitment problems that would leave budget constraints soft. A 
more radical alternative would be to allow all states to use market borrowing, with only 
poorer states receiving grants for capital spending. As discussed in Section 4, this will 
require further reform, including privatization, of the financial sector. Issues of credible 
                                                 
53 The broader issue of the proper role of the Planning Commission is addressed below. 
54 Rao, Singh and Vasishtha (2002) find that levels of plan transfers vary substantially across plans.  
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commitment to a “no-bailout” policy would remain, but private lending through the 
market may still be more transparent and efficient than lending from central government 
tax receipts. 
 
Two other areas of ongoing reform also bear on the transfer system, either by changing 
the environment within which it works, or through direct interactions. The assignment of 
tax authority is obviously important in influencing the starting point from which 
intergovernmental transfers are made. Second, the explicit strengthening of local 
governments, with formal transfer systems being introduced for state-local transfers, must 
impact center-state fiscal relations. We consider these issues next. 
Tax Reform 
There are several ways in which the tax system impinges on overall reform and the 
performance of the economy. Taxes create allocative distortions, and these have 
sometimes been particularly severe in the Indian case, often raising costs for industry to 
uncompetitive levels. Tax revenue is clearly a critical source of financing for overcoming 
infrastructure bottlenecks and providing minimum standards of public services. 
Globalization and opening up the economy have two direct impacts. First, to the extent 
that aggregate tariff revenue falls as tariff rates are lowered, they increase the importance 
of other sources of tax revenue. Second, the mobility of tax bases increases, making it 
more difficult to tap these sources. These forces mean that high effective tax rates on 
narrow bases, aside from the inefficiencies they create, are also now more difficult to 
sustain. 
 
Some elements of tax reform in the last two decades55 are well known: a reduction in 
tariff rates, reductions in direct tax rates coupled with attempts to broaden the tax base, 
and a gradual movement from excise duties and sales taxes to VAT at both the central 
and state levels, the last being to avoid cascading and very high and variable effective 
rates of indirect taxation. Comparing 1990-91 with 1999-2000, the impact of some of 
these changes has been as follows: an increase in the direct-tax-to-GDP ratio from 2.16% 
to 3.24 %, accompanied by an increase in the number of filers from 6.1 to 17.8 million; 
more than offset by a decrease in the central indirect-tax-to-GDP ratio from 8.84 % to 
6.23 %, driven by reductions in the percentages of central excise duties as well as 
customs duties.56 State sales taxes and excise duties have also shown a proportionate 
decline, so that the overall tax-GDP ratio has declined by almost two percentage points in 
the 1990s (Rao, 2000a). While the overall decline merely reverses an increase that took 
place in the 1980s, the fact that it has occurred at higher GDP levels raises questions 
about long-term implications. Some of the lack of buoyancy in tax revenues may be due 
to the recent slowdown of manufacturing. However, there are also dimensions of tax 
reform that have yet to be tackled. 
 
Three areas yet to be fully integrated into the tax base are agriculture, small-scale 
industry, and services. Agricultural taxation, in the form of the land tax (assigned to the 
                                                 
55 Many reforms started with the report of the Tax Reform Committee of 1991, but some began earlier. 
Mohan (2002b) lists some o f the most significant tax reforms in India. 
56 These figures are from Singh and Modi (2001), Tables I, III and IV. 
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states), has withered away. Small-scale units for the purposes of the reservations are 
either exempt from paying excise duties, or pay lower rates than other firms in the same 
sectors. This cuts out an important part of the tax base, provides an avenue for tax 
evasion, makes administration more complex, and provides a further incentive for small-
scale units to remain small (Mohan, 2002a). To the extent that small-scale reservations 
can be removed, this problem will be reduced, but since these tax breaks were introduced 
relatively recently, in 1986, they might be delinked from the politically more difficult 
(but desirable) removal of reservations. Finally, the problem created by the failure of the 
Constitution to explicitly include “services” within the scope of states’ sales tax authority 
has been recognized for some time, and is in need of correction (see below).  
 
The Tax Reform Committee had also recommended minimizing exemptions and 
concessions, simplification of laws and procedures, development of modern, 
computerized information systems, and improvements in administration and enforcement 
(Rao, 2000a). Das-Gupta and Mookherjee (1998, Chapter 6) detailed the problems with 
Indian tax administration, both in terms of the incentives of those paying taxes and those 
enforcing them. However, several years later, Singh and Modi (2001, focusing on central 
tax collection) still noted, “The tax enforcement effort has left much to be desired … 
from the view point of a decline in total tax collected as a percentage of collectible tax, 
the pendency of assessment work and the dilatory process of the Appeal redressal 
mechanism.” Thus it is clear that much remains to be done in this respect. The benefits of 
improvements in this area are likely to be large, not only because of the direct benefits of 
improvements in central information systems and institutions of enforcement, but also 
because these can provide a model for states to improve their tax administration as well.  
 
A reform that directly affects India’s federal system lies in indirect taxes, which, as we 
have noted, have not increased proportionately with GDP in the last decade. As Rao 
(2000a) puts it, “The most important challenge in restructuring the tax system in the 
country is to evolve a coordinated consumption tax system.” Rao provides some detailed 
recommendations on the current assignments of indirect taxes, with respect to issues such 
as rates, interstate sales taxes, and tax administration for a dual VAT coordinated 
between the center and the states. Rao also notes the problem created by the failure of the 
Constitution to explicitly include “services” within the scope of states’ sales tax 
authority. This problem has been recognized for some time, but has increased in 
importance as the structure of GDP has shifted from commodity production to services: 
fixing this was also recommended by the Eleventh Finance Commission. 
 
Moving taxation of services from the Union list, where it implicitly lies through the 
center’s residual powers over taxes not explicitly specified in the Constitution, to the 
Concurrent list will require a constitutional amendment. Such an amendment must be 
proposed by the central government, but will benefit the states. Rao incorporates political 
economy considerations by suggesting that an amendment be tied to persuading the states 
to reduce and eventually eliminate taxation of interstate sales, thus removing some of the 
internal barriers that have plagued the development of a true national market within 
India.57 This will also smooth the implementation of a destination based VAT for the 
                                                 
57 While the fundamental problem in India is the absence of an interstate commerce clause such as that in 
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states. Note that such reforms can also reduce tax exporting by the richer states, (Rao and 
Singh, 1998; Rao, Shand and Kalirajan, 1999). 
 
Taxation of services illustrates a broader issue addressed by the Eleventh Finance 
Commission, which recommended in general giving the states more power to tax, to 
reduce the vertical fiscal imbalance. This approach takes some pressure off the fiscal 
transfer system, allowing states that can obtain political support to more flexibly tax their 
own constituents to deliver benefits to them. Another possible example of such a tax 
reassignment would be to allow states to piggyback on central income taxes. This, too, 
would require a constitutional amendment. With tax sharing no longer applied to specific 
tax “handles”, but to tax revenues in total, this change would give states more flexibility 
at the margin, where they properly should have it.  Note that states are already assigned 
the right to tax agricultural income, though their use of this tax is minimal. This 
separation has no economic justification, and merely promotes tax evasion. 
Piggybacking, along with a removal of the distinction between nonagricultural and 
agricultural income (possibly with provisions to mitigate the effects of risks in 
agriculture), would represent a major improvement in tax assignments. Whether the 
political economy logic can work for this case of tied reforms, as suggested for the case 
of services above, is worth considering. 
 
To summarize our discussion, much remains to be done in terms of tax reform. While 
some measures can be initiated by the center acting alone, many others require agreement 
or coordination between the center and the states. These include possible reassignments 
of tax authority, as well as changes in tax administration. Recognizing the play of 
differing interests may help in devising reform packages that balance potential losses 
against gains, and thereby increase the probability of acceptance. Rationalizing India’s 
tax system at all levels of government has become more important because of the opening 
up of the economy to foreign competition. Therefore continued tax reform should be a 
priority. How to implement this across different levels of the government will be 
considered after we discuss decentralization. 
Decentralization 
The political motivations and history of local government reform in India have been quite 
different from those that led to the economic reforms of the 1990s. Nevertheless, there is 
a complementarity between the two sets of reforms that benefits from their temporal 
coincidence. After a long history of debate on decentralization, a central government 
committee recommended that local bodies should be given constitutional status.  Two 
separate amendment bills were introduced, covering panchayats (village governments) 
                                                                                                                                                 
the US constitution, there is still room for bargained solutions that will reduce internal trade barriers. For 
example, the recent replacement of local transit taxes (octroi) with state entry taxes in some states has 
shifted the problem up one level, reducing the number of entities that have to be involved in the 
negotiation.  Earlier, in 1975, the central government entered into an agreement with the states to abolish 
sales taxes on textiles, sugar and tobacco, replacing them with an additional central excise duty, the entire 
proceeds of which were assigned to the states. Interestingly, this bargaining perspective of federalism, 
which we have emphasized heavily in this paper, finds an echo in the following statement of the recent task 
force on implementation of the FRBM Act (Government of India, 2004): “The Task Force proposes a 
‘grand bargain’ whereby States will have the power to tax all services concurrently with the Centre.” (p. 6) 
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and municipalities respectively, passed by parliament in 1992, ratified by more than half 
the state assemblies, and brought into force as the 73rd and 74th amendments to the 
Constitution in 1993.  These amendments required individual states to pass appropriate 
legislation, since local government remained a state subject under the Constitution, and 
they have done so.58 
 
Until the recent legislative changes, the ability to exercise local suffrage was very 
limited. The amendments require direct elections to local bodies to be held every five 
years. If a local government is dissolved prematurely by the state, elections must be held 
within six months, something that was not required earlier. Rao and Singh (2000, 2001) 
have characterized this aspect of local government reform as replacing ‘hierarchy’ with 
‘voice’59 as the primary accountability mechanism, and have explained this as a positive 
step based on the ability to provide more targeted incentives to government decision-
makers, based on the narrower locus on which their performance can be judged. Of 
course, this is subject to the caveat of transparency and effective monitoring being 
achievable. Local government reform has also changed the nature of tax and expenditure 
assignments to these governments, and instituted a system of formal state-local transfers 
modeled on that of the central Finance Commission. While there are some serious issues 
with the new assignments, including problems of local capacity and efficiency, both with 
respect to revenues and expenditures, we focus here on the new transfer system. 
 
While it has been argued that formal transfers from the center and states to local 
governments could accentuate fiscal deficit problems, an explicit, rule-governed system 
can instead make existing problems more transparent, as a first step toward mitigating 
them. Local government finances, particularly for urban bodies, had steadily worsened 
over the period before local government reform, under a system of hierarchical control 
and monitoring by state governments. This is not to imply that the State Finance 
Commissions (SFCs) represent an immediate improvement. Almost all SFCs have given 
their initial reports, and the Eleventh Finance Commission summed them up as follows: 
Many SFC reports have not … provided a clear idea of the powers, 
authority and responsibilities actually entrusted to the local bodies. Many 
of these reports also do not clearly indicate the principles formulated for 
sharing or assignment of State taxes, duties, tolls, fees and the grants-in-
aid. (Paragraph 8.11b) 
However, this situation is somewhat better than the previous one of ad hoc and 
discretionary transfers and control of local bodies by state governments: local 
government reform has added welcome transparency to existing problems, as well as 
greater certainty to transfers. 
 
The Eleventh Finance Commission was, rightly, reluctant to provide the states with 
grants requested by them to supplement their own transfers to local governments, noting 
that the amendments do not justify this softening of the states’ budget constraints. The 
                                                 
58 See Rao and Singh (2000, 2001) for more details. See also Mathur (1999) for an assessment of urban 
governments and reform. 
59 See Hirschman (1970) for the introduction and discussion of this terminology. 
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Commission’s main recommendations with respect to local government related to 
assignment and incentive issues for various sources of tax revenue.  Land and profession 
taxes were identified as two possible sources of revenue.  The recommendation of 
surcharges on state taxes earmarked for local government is similar to the piggybacking 
we proposed for the states on central taxes. It would be useful to allow local governments 
to determine their own rates, perhaps subject to a state-imposed minimum level.  These 
recommendations are straightforward – the problems arise in defining details and 
assuring implementation.  This point also applies to the Commission’s discussion of 
property taxes, replacements for octroi, and local user charges.   
 
The analysis of Rao and Singh (2000) suggests that incentive efficiency with respect to 
government expenditure must be the starting point for revenue enhancement efforts.  The 
Commission was right to suggest a quicker transfer of expenditure responsibilities to 
local governments: they are unlikely to do worse than state governments have so far 
done, in the provision of basic civic amenities.  Grants to the lowest tier of local 
government recommended by the Commission may help to jumpstart the process of 
making local governments effective providers, if they can break out of their historical 
low-level equilibrium of revenue collection and service provision.  
 
The Commission also recommended grants for improved accounting, auditing, and 
database building for local governments.  These measures, if implemented effectively, 
can have a substantial positive impact on capacity, transparency and accountability in the 
delivery of local government services such as primary education and basic health.  The 
report also discussed some of the potential conflicts between the existing institutional 
apparatus of central and centrally sponsored schemes and the role envisaged for local 
governments,60 and problems that are arising from states’ reluctance to devolve authority 
to their subordinate governments. One example of the latter problem is the failure of state 
governments to implement their own SFCs’ reports.  In the case of the central Finance 
Commission, the bargaining power of the states, and the role of precedent have worked to 
ensure the implementation of most recommendations.  In the case of the states, local 
governments may need outside help, for example from the courts, to pressure reluctant 
state governments. 
 
Primary education and basic health and nutrition represent important aspects of any 
country’s development, and it is widely accepted that India’s performance on these fronts 
has been mediocre or worse (e.g., Dreze and Sen, 1995). Global comparisons and the 
process of globalization have heightened this relative failure, and its negative 
consequences in terms of low productivity as well as direct welfare losses. In this respect, 
greater responsibility of state and local governments in ensuring adequate levels of 
education, health and nutrition as a result of the reform processes described above may 
have positive impacts by increasing the efficiency with which scarce public resources are 
                                                 
60 Currently, central discretionary transfers, which are meant to be implemented at the district or block 
level, swamp local government capacity for action and for their own revenue raising (Rajaraman, 2001). 
Replacing these with conditional or unconditional grants from the states (with the ultimate source possibly 
being unconditional grants from the center), will allow more effective functioning of local governments. 
This ties in with our earlier discussion of reform of the center-state transfer system. 
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raised, transferred and spent. As we discuss later in this section, some of the poorer states 
have been able to overcome resource constraints to achieve quantifiable improvements in 
‘human development’. 
Intergovernmental Institutions 
Local government reform has complicated intergovernmental relations in India, by 
allowing the center to bypass state governments to some extent, such as by making direct 
transfers to local governments. In fact, it has been argued that this was the political 
motivation for such reform. In general, the economic reform process has changed the 
nature of center-state interactions, and this has been compounded by coalition rule at the 
center. Issues of fiscal deficits, tax reform, policies toward FDI, infrastructure 
development and regulation all require some coordination between the center and the 
states. In this context, institutions such as the Inter-State Council (ISC) may actually have 
a greater role to play than earlier. 
 
While states that are pivotal, and hence politically powerful in a coalition government at 
the center may be able to directly extract concessions from the central government (as the 
government of Andhra Pradesh61 appears to have done in some cases in the previous 
national government), this does not make the ISC redundant. The potential role of the 
ISC is precisely to provide an alternative to such ad hoc bargaining. Furthermore, 
bargaining over durable changes in rules governing the federation is quite different from 
bargaining over specific instances. For example, the ISC was an important forum for 
gaining acceptance of the change in tax sharing recommended by the Tenth Finance 
Commission.62 More recently, it has also been a place where an important change in the 
rules governing inter-state water disputes has been approved by the states (Richards and 
Singh, 2002). Clearly, tax reform, changes in the way that states borrow, policies toward 
FDI, and regulation of sectors such as power are all areas where the ISC can provide a 
less public, more focused forum for bargaining over issues that jointly affect the center 
and the states than is possible in either house of parliament. 
 
The role of the ISC may also be expanded if the current process of planning is reformed, 
as we have argued earlier in this section. The NDC now serves as the bargaining forum 
for plan transfers and loans, and we have suggested that these might be replaced by a dual 
system of block grants and market-based loans. This change would make the NDC 
redundant. Instead, the ISC may be the place for evolving a new institutional framework; 
bargaining over general rules, not specific instances. In this respect, our perspective is an 
extension of Riker’s instrumental view of federalism, as “a constitutional bargain among 
politicians”, with the motives being “military and diplomatic defense or aggression” 
(Riker, 1975, pp. 113-114). Our extensions to this concept are to include bargaining not 
just in constitution making, but also in evolution of subsequent governance, and not just 
for territorial protection or gain, but also over splitting the economic pie. 
                                                 
61 It is important to note that the Telegu Desam Party of Andhra Pradesh also controlled the state 
government at that time. In other cases (the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam of Tamil Nadu and Trinamool 
Congress of West Bengal) the regional party in the ruling coalition may not have been in a position to 
represent its state’s interests as forcefully or directly. 
62 See also Kapur (2001) for additional examples. 
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We can summarize the main message of this section as follows. A further devolution of 
expenditure assignments, as is being implemented in the ongoing local government 
reform, makes sense from an efficiency perspective, because it allows better-targeted 
incentives for government decision-makers. This must be accompanied by devolution of 
tax assignments, to keep vertical fiscal imbalances from overwhelming such incentives. 
Since vertical fiscal imbalances will still arise, we argue for a simpler transfer system that 
does not distort marginal incentives. While there is still room for transfers and loans that 
are earmarked for capital expenditure, we argue that here, too, marginal incentives are 
crucial, and that providing these through the market may be the only efficient avenue in 
practice. This argument is based on the recognition that political influences will distort 
choices in the absence of such discipline, no matter how legal restraints are structured. 
While decentralization and privatization may seem to exacerbate problems of interstate 
inequality, they also enable higher-level governments to focus more clearly and directly 
on redistribution as an objective wherever it is deemed necessary. The transition to a new 
set of rules requires bargaining over change, and we have suggested the ISC as a formal 
institution within which this might occur. 
Regional Inequalities63 
To the extent that globalization and economic liberalization may increase inequality 
across the constituent units of India’s federation, they could exacerbate political tensions 
and, in the extreme, threaten the country’s unity. Various secessionist movements have 
certainly existed throughout India’s post-colonial history. Hence, we examine the 
evidence on increasing regional inequality, discuss possible causes and the likely political 
effects of any such increases, and consider policy responses in the context of an 
environment of continued globalization. In particular, we examine whether there might 
be conflicts between the objective of moderating regional inequalities and those of 
promoting market efficiency and hardening budget constraints. In doing so, we discuss 
some of the political and economic factors that necessarily shape a federal bargain. 
 
Many studies have examined the issue of regional inequalities in India, whether they are 
increasing, and how changes are affected by initial conditions such as the level of 
infrastructure development. These studies are partly motivated by the fears of some that, 
as India integrates into the global economy, enclaves that successfully pursue this 
integration will grow rapidly, leaving the rest of the economy behind. These studies 
typically use the framework of growth theory to examine absolute or conditional 
convergence.64 A small subset of these studies is summarized in Table 7. 
                                                 
63 See Rao and Singh (2001) for more details on previous studies, including those not covered here. 
64 Thus, one can identify three possible scenarios: absolute convergence, where different entities are 
moving toward the same steady state, conditional convergence, where they are converging to (possibly 
very) different steady states, and divergence, where there is no evidence of convergence. The last case is 
inconsistent with neoclassical growth models, but conceivably fits some endogenous growth models. Note 
that conditional convergence is quite consistent with increasing disparities across entities. Variables such as 
literacy, health and physical infrastructure, as well as the economic policies followed, may be the 
conditioning variables. While the evidence for any type of convergence across disparate countries is quite 
weak, one might expect greater possibilities for convergence across similar regions or constituent units of a 
federation than across countries. 
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Here, we extend earlier studies by examining if flows of capital to different states affect 
regional inequalities for the 1990s.65  We proxy interstate movements of domestic capital, 
with bank credit-deposit ratios for the 14 major states. Trends over the last two decades 
are summarized in Table 8. The average credit-deposit ratio shows a slight decline from 
1980 to 1995, and is thereafter about the same in 2001. The (unweighted) standard 
deviation creeps up from the initial year to 1995, and increases further in 2001. While the 
increase is not great, the sharp decline in the credit-deposit ratio for the states of Bihar 
and UP is striking. Also, the correlation between the ratio and per capita SDP jumps 
dramatically from 1995 to 2001, after a much smaller increase in the earlier period (1980 
to 1995), even when the coefficient of variation of per capita SDP for these states does 
not increase. 
  
Table 9 presents results for some simple convergence regressions, focusing on three 
different financial variables: FDI approvals per capita over the decade 1991-2001, 1990 
per capita bank credit (a proxy for private investment) and 1990 credit-deposit ratios. The 
results are quite striking. First, the evidence for convergence or divergence is 
inconclusive, since the coefficient of base-year SDP is never significantly different from 
one.66 Second, any one of the financial variables taken individually is estimated to have a 
significant impact on growth of SDP. When two or more financial variables are included, 
there is evidence of multicollinearity, but otherwise the results are robust. They are 
consistent with a story where domestic and foreign capital are complements, and taken 
together with our earlier discussion of credit-deposit ratios and of FDI approvals, the 
evidence is suggestive of mobile domestic and foreign capital driving growth. From an 
efficiency point of view, this is probably a good thing, but the equity consequences bear 
some consideration. We assess the evidence and discuss possible policy implications. 
 
First, it is important to note that some of the evidence for divergence among India’s states 
appears in the 1980s, before the recent reforms. The 1980s saw an appreciable increase in 
India’s growth rate compared to earlier periods. Hence, the 1990s reforms cannot be the 
sole cause in increased regional inequality. Measures such as the Gini coefficient do 
suggest that inter-state inequality has increased particularly in the 1990s,67 but the 
evidence from our growth regressions is not conclusive.  
 
Second, the studies typically use SDP to measure outcomes. Thus, remittances by internal 
migrants (e.g., Biharis working as agricultural laborers in Punjab) and external ones 
(Keralites working in health care in the Middle East) are being missed by the analysis. 
Internal as well as international remittances, once included, might change the picture. 
While we do not have state wise income data, other outcome measures can be used. Table 
10 shows the Human Development Indices (HDIs) for the 14 major states, at decade 
intervals for three years, 1981, 1991, and 2001. The HDI includes literacy, infant 
                                                 
65 Migration data, when available, can allow one to also look at inter-state flows of labor. However, such 
data may underestimate migration (Srivastava, 1998). 
66 This is true whether one uses a one-sided or two-sided test. 
67 On the other hand, estimated Gini coefficients for personal income distribution do not show any increase 
from 1990 to 2000. 
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mortality, access to safe water and durably constructed housing, as well as formal 
education, poverty ratios and per capita expenditure. Not only has the HDI been rising 
over the two decades, but also the standard deviation of the distribution across states has 
not risen, resulting in a substantial fall in the coefficient of variation (CV). The CV for 
the HDI is also lower than the CV for SDP, though this could be an artifact of the scales 
used for components of the HDI. This data suggests that other factors (e.g., remittances, 
government expenditures) do mitigate some of the apparent regional inequalities in India. 
 
Despite the qualifications we have discussed, commonly held perceptions of growing 
inequality or unfairness may be enough to require policy attention. Previous secessionist 
movements or other regional political tensions have been driven by a complex mix of 
ethnic, linguistic and economic factors, but economic policies have often been part of the 
political response. 68  At the same time, the central government’s fiscal situation does not 
allow for money to be thrown at such problems. We have argued above for reforms in the 
intergovernmental transfer system that might allow better targeting of transfers to deal 
with states that may be ‘left behind’ by liberalization, through grants or soft loans for 
infrastructure investment, restricted to poorer states. Transfers may be more effective if 
they are based on simpler formulae and objectives, without the center trying to impose 
direct controls. On the other hand, Ahluwalia (2002a) argues for imposing more effective 
conditionalities on transfers, to improve the use of transferred funds by the states. This 
could work against reduction in interstate inequalities. Furthermore, this recommendation 
assumes that the center is able to effectively monitor such conditionalities, something that 
has not been true in the past. 
 
In general, even formulaic transfers can be subject to political influence effects (Rao and 
Singh, 2000), as part of the ongoing federal bargaining process. Also, equalizing transfers 
may be offset by other, implicit transfers that favor better-off states.69 Furthermore, the 
impact of intergovernmental transfers may be to distort the fiscal incentives of recipients 
in ways that hurt short-run efficiency and long-run growth, as is argued in the literature 
on ‘market preserving federalism’ (MPF: see, e.g., Weingast, 1993). One need not take 
an extreme position on this to agree with the view that limiting the size and scope of 
intergovernmental transfers can increase efficiency, while also arguing that targeting 
transfers to poorer regions or states is politically desirable. 
 
In the context of equity objectives, it is important to be clear about the connection 
between reforming the intergovernmental transfer system and inter-state inequalities in 
income. Reforms cannot cancel out increases in inter-state income inequalities. However, 
they can make the formal transfer system clearer and simpler, which should make it 
                                                 
68 This point also applies if one allows for internal migration. While migration may help to support 
convergence, in a heterogeneous country such as India, it may bring its own set of problems. If effective 
equalizing fiscal transfers can reduce interregional migration pressures or slow down the process, they may 
have a positive role in preserving interethnic, or other intergroup, peace. Srivastava (1998), based on micro 
surveys, suggests that temporary employment opportunities drive a substantial amount of migration in 
India, beyond what is reflected in national statistics. 
69 Rao, Shand and Kalirajan (1999) argue that explicit center-state transfers have had moderate impacts on 
interstate inequalities, and that these effects have been outweighed by implicit transfers through subsidized 
(public and private) lending and through interstate tax exportation. 
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easier to define its proper objective as one of enabling state governments to potentially 
provide minimal levels of public services. Table 11 (adapted from Table 4 of Rao and 
Singh, 2002) indicates the relative magnitudes of state government revenues and 
expenditures (and hence center-state transfers70) compared to SDPs. For the 14 major 
states (excluding Goa), own revenue ranges from about 5 to 12% of GSDP, and ranges 
from about 30 to 70% of current expenditure. Center-state transfers cannot equalize post-
transfer per capita incomes, but they can substantially reduce inequalities in public 
service provision. The imperative is to do this in a manner that does not adversely affect 
incentives for raising own revenue. It is also important to note that some of the problems 
cannot be identified at the state level. States such as Maharashtra and Karnataka have 
high-income urbanized regions as well as much poorer rural regions within their 
boundaries. In such cases, the creation of stronger local governments and more formal 
mechanisms for transfers to them may help, as we have argued above.  
 
Finally, intergovernmental transfers can only do so much, and greater decentralization of 
tax assignments is an important complementary policy, as we have suggested earlier. In 
particular, they can make it easier to harden budget constraints in the long run by 
clarifying accountability, even if bailouts are not completely precluded. This perspective 
is also in the spirit of MPF or of Breton’s (1996) view of competitive federalism. At the 
same time, we recognize that higher-level governments will always exercise discretion 
where they can, a position forcefully taken by Riker (1975). In this respect, we are 
sympathetic to the view expressed by Frankel (2002) that avenues for the exercise of 
political discretion are necessary in the case of intergovernmental transfers. Nevertheless, 
one can strive to improve efficiency through institutional changes that promote effective 
monitoring and evaluation, including more market-based mechanisms for financing 




Our paper has sought to examine the interaction of India’s federal system and its ongoing 
economic reforms in the context of globalization. In our analysis, we have explicitly 
recognized that the national government has subnational governments below it, and that 
all these layers of government simultaneously interact with foreign governments and 
corporations in a global economy. We have examined real and financial sector reforms, 
including assignments of regulatory powers, infrastructure reform and development, and 
privatization. Despite the incomplete nature of financial reform, we have presented some 
evidence in Section 6 that liberalization is making a difference, with foreign and domestic 
capital together driving growth, and leading to some of the differential growth across 
states that has been observed in the last decade. However, we have also noted the 
problems created by government fiscal deficits and government control of the financial 
sector. 
 
Motivated by concerns over fiscal deficits, regional inequalities, and inefficient 
expenditures at all levels of government, we also considered reforms that directly affect 
intergovernmental relations. These included taxes, intergovernmental transfer 
                                                 
70 The difference between revenues and expenditures is made up of transfers and net fiscal deficits. 
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mechanisms, local government reforms, and institutions of intergovernmental bargaining 
and cooperation. Reforms in federal governance may be the key to opening the door to 
further reform elsewhere, by reducing the fiscal burden placed on the private sector by 
government deficits. We have acknowledged the political economy aspects of 
governance, and discussed possibilities for politically acceptable packages of fiscal 
reforms, such as combinations of changes in tax assignment that would be acceptable to 
the center as well as the state governments. 
 
The benefit of an approach that explicitly takes account of India’s federal institutions is 
that we have been able to identify some areas in which the states may be able to achieve 
positive reforms acting independently, and other areas where coordination between the 
central and the state governments in designing and implementing reform policies may be 
more appropriate. Furthermore, we have highlighted the challenges of greater openness to 
the world economy, and of perceptions of growing regional disparities. The former 
requires urgent attention to the financial position of the government in particular, as well 
as of the financial sector as a whole. The latter requires more efficient mechanisms for 
managing internal inequities. Together, they suggest the avenues of further reform that 
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Figure 1: India – States and Union Territories 
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Table 1: Central and State Fiscal Deficits (% of GDP) 
 
  Center States  Total 
1990-91  6.6 3.3 9.4 
1991-92  4.7 2.7 7.0 
1992-93  4.8 2.6 7.0 
1993-94  6.4 2.3 8.3 
1994-95  4.7 2.8 7.1 
1995-96  4.2 2.6 6.5 
1996-97  4.1 2.7 6.4 
1997-98  4.8 2.9 7.3 
1998-99  5.1 4.3 8.9 
1999-00  5.3 4.6 9.4 
2000-01  5.1 4.3 9.1 
 
 
Sources: Economic Survey of India, RBI Annual Report, Rao (2002), Srinivasan (2002) 
Note: The combined deficit indicators net out the inter-governmental transactions between the Center and 
States, and do not equal to the sum of the deficits of the Center and the States.  
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Table 2: Gross Domestic Product and its Sectoral Share 
 
  Gross domestic product 
(GDP) 
Sectoral share in GDP*  
(per cent) 
  (At factor 
cost) 




Industry  Services 
At 1993-94 prices  Rs. Crores      
1950-51  141557  149594  55.4  16.1  28.5 
1960-61  207704  222161  50.9  20.0  29.1 
1970-71  298580  329227  44.5  23.6  31.9 
1980-81  404246  442319  38.1  25.9  36.0 
1990-91  694925  773349  30.9  30.0  39.1 
1991-92  705149  781575  30.0  29.4  40.6 
1992-93  737018  818544  30.2  29.1  40.7 
1993-94  781345  859220  33.6  23.7  42.7 
1994-95  835864  922289  33.0  24.2  42.8 
1995-96  896990  992877  30.7  25.3  44.0 
1996-97  964390  1061902  31.0  25.2  43.8 
1997-98  1012816  1110384  29.2  25.3  45.5 
1998-99  1081834 1185399  29.2  24.7  46.1 
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Table 3: Major Economic Indicators – Annual Growth Rates (per cent) 
 






















Imports*  Exports* 
1981-82  5.8  6.0  5.6  2.9  9.3  9.9  –  12.3  12  – 4.4  2.6 
1982-83  2.7  3.1  – 3.8  –2.9  3.2  7  4.9  8.8  16.6  –2.6  4.6 
1983-84  7.5  7.7  13.7  17.7  6.7  7.6  7.5  12.1  18.2  3.5  3.8 
1984-85  4.2  4.3  –1.2  – 4.5  8.6  12.1  6.5  6.3  19  –5.9  4.5 
1985-86  4.5  4.5  2.5  3.4  8.7  8.4  4.4  6.8  16  11.5  –9.9 
1986-87  4.1  4.3  – 3.7  – 4.7  9.1  9.8  5.8  8.7  18.6  –2.1  9.4 
1987-88  3.6  3.8  – 0.8  – 2.1  7.3  8.8  8.2  8.8  16  9.1  24.1 
1988-89  10.1  10.5  21.4  21  8.7  10.2  7.5  9.4  17.8  13.6  15.6 
1989-90  6.7  6.7  2.1  0.6  8.6  11.2  7.4  6.1  19.4  8.8  18.9 
1990-91  5.5  5.6  3.8  3.2  8.2  7.8  10.3  11.6  15.1  13.5  9.2 
1991-92  1.1  1.3  –2.0  – 4.5  0.6  9.1  13.7   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
13.5 19.3  –19.4  –1.5 
1992-93  5.1  5.1  4.1  6.6  2.3  5  10.1 9.6 15.7  12.7  3.8 
1993-94  5.9  5.9  3.8  2.7  6.0  7.3  8.4 7.5 18.4  6.5  20.0 
1994-95  7.2  7.3  4.9  3.8  8.4  8.1  12.5 10.1 22.3  22.9  18.4 
1995-96  7.5  7.3  – 2.7  – 5.8  12.8  8.6  8.1 10.2 13.7  28.0  20.9 
1996-97  8.2  7.8  9.1  10.5  5.6  4.3  4.6 9.4 15.9  6.5  5.3 
1997-98  4.8  4.8  – 5.4  –3.5  6.6  6.6  4.4 6.8 17.3  6.1  4.5 
1998-99  6.4  6.5  7.5  5.6  4.1  6.5  5.9 13.1 19.4  2.2  -5.1 
1999-2000  6.2  6.1  -0.7  1.4  6.7  6.9  3.3 3.4 13.9  17.2  10.8 
2000-2001  3.9  4.0  1.5  -  5.0  4.5  7.0 3.8 15.0  1.7  21.0 
Note: * revised (at 1993-94 prices).   
http://meadev.nic.in/economy/mei.htm,  http://www.nic.in/stat/stat_act_t1.htm, Reserve Bank of India, http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2001-02/chapt2002/tab12.pdf, 
http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2001-02/chapt2002/tab16.pdf 
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Table 4: Relative Infrastructure Development Indices, 14 Major States 
 
 
  1980-81 1991-92 1996-97
Bihar 83.5 81.7 77.8
Rajasthan 74.4 82.6 83.9
Uttar Pradesh  97.7 102.3 103.8
Orissa 81.5 95.0 98.9
Madhya Pradesh 62.1 71.5 74.1
Andhra Pradesh  98.1 96.8 93.1
Tamil Nadu  158.6 145.9 138.9
Kerala 158.1 158.0 155.4
Karnataka 94.8 96.5 94.3
West Bengal  110.6 92.1 90.8
Gujarat 123.0 122.9 121.8
Haryana 145.0 143.0 137.2
Maharashtra 120.1 109.6 111.3
Punjab 207.3 193.4 185.6
All India  100 100 100
 
Source: CMIE and Ahluwalia (2002a) 
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Table 5: Commercial Bank Deposits and Priority Credit 
 
 
  1969                  1990 1993 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Deposits of Scheduled Commercial 
Banks as percentage of National  
Income (at current prices) 
15.5                  48.6 50.4 46.3 46.4 49.6 50.3 53.5 55.7
Share of Priority Sector  
Advances in total 
14.0                  40.7 34.4 32.8 34.8 34.6 35.3 35.4 ..
 
Source: RBI various statistical tables, www.rbi.org.in. 
Note: 1969 data are for June, other years for March 
 
  49Indian Federalism, Economic Reform and Globalization, Nirvikar Singh and T. N. Srinivasan 
 
Table 6: FDI approvals August 1991- July 2001, 14 Major States 
 
 




FDI per capita 
(Rs.) 
Bihar  8833.43 86.374  102.27 
Rajasthan  25916.69 44.006  588.94 
Uttar Pradesh  43304.25 139.112 311.29 
Orissa  82289.14 31.660  2599.15 
Madhya Pradesh  97709.14 66.181  1476.39 
Andhra Pradesh  124701.31 66.508  1874.98 
Tamil Nadu  222804.00 55.859  3988.69 
Kerala  14360.83 29.098  493.53 
Karnataka  208156.32 44.977  4628.06 
West Bengal  84234.59 68.078  1237.32 
Gujarat  168555.48 41.310  4080.26 
Haryana  31947.46 16.464  1940.44 
Maharashtra  456286.23 78.937  5780.38 
Punjab  19519.22 20.282  962.39 
14 States  1588618.09  788.846  2013.85 
 
Sources: FDI – Secretariat for Industrial Assistance Newsletter, August 2001; population – 
http://www.censusindia.net/data.html 
Note: Figures for Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh include FDI approvals for Jharkand, 
Chhattisgarh and Uttaranchal respectively 
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Table 7: Convergence Studies for India’s States 
 
Study Period  No.  of 
States 
Main Results 
Cashin and Sahay 
(1996) 
1961-91  20  Slow absolute and conditional convergence. 




1970-94  17  Absolute divergence, conditional convergence. 
Share of agriculture, infrastructure, political and 
institutional factors (state fixed effects) matter. 
Rao, Shand and 
Kalirajan (RSK, 1999) 
1965-95  14  Absolute and conditional divergence, faster in 
early 90s. Private investment matters. 
Aiyar (2001)  1971-96  19  Conditional convergence; infrastructure, private 
investment and nonmeasured institutional 
factors matter. 
Ahluwalia (2002a)  1981-99  14  Gini coefficient of per capita SDP (weighted by 
population) increased from late 1980s, through 
1990s. Convergence not allowed for, but private 
investment matters for growth. 
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Table 8: Credit-Deposit Ratios by State 
 
 
  1980 1995 2001 
Bihar  0.41 0.33 0.24 
Rajasthan  0.68  0.46 0.48 
Uttar Pradesh  0.42 0.35 0.28 
Orissa  0.59 0.54 0.41 
Madhya Pradesh  0.56 0.53 0.47 
Andhra Pradesh  0.74 0.76 0.63 
Tamil Nadu  0.94 0.91 0.91 
Kerala  0.68  0.45 0.43 
Karnataka  0.75 0.68 0.59 
West Bengal  0.60 0.54 0.44 
Gujarat  0.58 0.47 0.49 
Haryana  0.72  0.47 0.42 
Maharashtra  0.79 0.70 0.85 









Std. Deviation.  0.15  0.16  0.18 
Coeff. of Var.  0.22  0.27  0.32 
Coeff. of Var. 
(SDP) 
0.32 0.40 0.36 
Corr
n. with per 
capita SDP 
0.11 0.18 0.59 
 
 
Sources: RBI Bulletins, National Accounts Statistics, and Indian Census. Figures for Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh in 2001 include Jharkand, Chhattisgarh and Uttaranchal respectively. SDP and 
population figures used to calculate correlations were for closest available years. 
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Table 9: Growth Regressions 
 
Dependent variable is log of 1998-99 per capita SDP 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
Variable  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7) 































p. c. 1991-2001  
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Table 10: State Level Human Development Indices 
 
 
State  1981 1981 1991 1991 2001 2001 
   Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank 
Andhra Pradesh  0.298 9 0.377 9 0.416  10 
Bihar  0.237 14 0.308 14 0.367 14 
Gujarat  0.360 4 0.431 6 0.479 6 
Haryana  0.360 5 0.443 5 0.509 5 
Karnataka  0.346 6 0.412 7 0.478 7 
Kerala  0.500 1 0.591 1 0.638 1 
Madhya Pradesh  0.245 13 0.328 12 0.394 12 
Maharashtra  0.363 3 0.452 4 0.523 4 
Orissa  0.267 10 0.345 11 0.404 11 
Punjab  0.411 2 0.475 2 0.537 2 
Rajasthan  0.256 11 0.347 10 0.424  9 
Tamil Nadu  0.343 7 0.466 3 0.531 3 
Uttar Pradesh  0.255 12 0.314 13 0.388 13 
West Bengal  0.305 8 0.404 8 0.472 8 
All India  0.302  0.381  0.472  
        
Unweighted average  0.325  0.407  0.469  
Standard deviation  0.071  0.075  0.072  
Coefficient of variation  0.219  0.185  0.155  
 
 
Source: Planning Commission (2002) 
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 GSDP  
(Rs) 
  





as % of  
GSDP 
(percent) 





 own revenue 
 to current  
 expenditure  
I. Major States           
A. High Income States  21196.0  2141.0  10.1  3140.0  68.2 
 1. Gujarat  18791.6  2196.5  11.7  3301.7  66.5 
 2. Goa  25304.8  6608.5  26.1  8445.9  78.2 
 3. Haryana  19491.2  2388.1  12.3  3614.3  66.1 
 4. Maharashtra  22762.7  1982.2  8.7  2861.8  69.3 
 5. Punjab  20675.1  2058.8  10.0  3618.9  56.9 
B. Middle Income States  15305.3  1330.9  8.7  2385.2  55.8 
 1. Andhra Pradesh   13852.9  1320.8  9.5  2281.6  57.9 
 2. Karnataka  15889.0  1644.7  10.4  2433.1  67.6 
 3. Kerala  17755.8  1634.6  9.2  2896.8  56.4 
 4. Tamil Nadu  17348.4  1766.9  10.2  2900.2  60.9 
 5. West Bengal   13696.4  665.5  4.9  1837.3  36.2 
C. Low Income States  8765.7  641.4  7.3  1620.5  39.6 
 1. Bihar  5923.3  392.0  6.6  1090.7  35.9 
 2. Madhya Pradesh  10153.3  886.2  8.7  1828.5  48.5 
 3. Orissa  8718.9  577.7  6.6  1926.8  30.0 
 4. Rajasthan  11044.6  1013.1  9.2  2215.8  45.7 
 5. Uttar Pradesh  9078.1  569.1  6.3  1581.1  36.0 
II. Special Category States  9805.2  650.8  6.6  3394.5  19.2 
 1. Arunachal Pradesh  11304.8  666.1  5.9  6559.8  10.2 
 2. Assam  8393.1  557.5  6.6  1716.3  32.5 
 3. Himachal Pradesh   12691.6  1201.9  9.5  5154.3  23.3 
 4. Jammu & Kashmir  10271.8  749.8  7.3  5113.4  14.7 
 5. Manipur  9262.6  258.5  2.8  3277.6  7.9 
 6. Meghalaya  10606.7  601.5  5.7  3505.6  17.2 
 7. Mizoram  11698.9  499.4  4.3  7599.6  6.6 
 8. Nagaland  15389.9  499.7  3.2  6536.4  7.6 
 9. Sikkim  14425.3  1336.1  9.3  9692.9  13.8 
  10.Tripura  9187.5  356.8 3.9 3253.8 11.0 
              All States  18038.5  1117.3  6.2  2218.8  50.4 
 
Note: Revenues and Expenditures are net of Lotteries; GSDP – Gross State Domestic Product. 
Data Sources:    1. Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, December 2000  
    2. Public Finance Statistics, Ministry of Finance, Government of India 
From Rao and Singh (2002) 
 
  